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Introduction 
In March 2008 the Government released its 
long-awaited National Security Strategy of 
the United Kingdom: Security in an 
Interdependent World. The report declared 
that  “The Cold War threat has been replaced 
by a diverse but interconnected set of threats 
and risks… driven by a diverse and 
interconnected set of underlying factors, 
including climate change, competition for 
energy, poverty and poor governance, 
demographic changes and globalisation.”1 
The complexity of the future security 
landscape and the interdependence of threats 
to British security are the strategy’s 
watchwords. In fact the report argues that 
“the complex interdependence of the threats, 
risks and drivers of insecurity, in an 
increasingly interconnected world, is in itself 
a powerful argument for a single 
overarching strategy for national security.”2 
                                                     
1 The National Security Strategy of the United 
Kingdom, Command 7291, Cabinet Office, London, p. 
3. 
2 Ibid., p. 24. 
In January 2008 Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown pledged that “in the run-up to the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty review 
conference in 2010 we will be at the 
forefront of the international campaign to 
accelerate disarmament amongst possessor 
states, to prevent proliferation to new 
states, and to ultimately achieve a world 
that is free from nuclear weapons”. This 
followed Foreign Secretary Margaret 
Beckett’s vision of the UK as a 
“disarmament laboratory” set out in June 
2007.3 
 
In light of these developments it is vital to 
ask where the threat to kill tens if not 
hundreds of thousands of people with 
British nuclear weapons fits in to the 
National Security Strategy’s view of the 
world? Where does the steady march to 
                                                     
3 Margaret Beckett, “A World Free of Nuclear 
Weapons?”, Carnegie International Nonproliferation 
Conference, Keynote Address, June 25, 2007; 
Gordon Brown, “Speech to Speech at the Chamber 
of Commence in Delhi”, January 21, 2008. 
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replace the current Trident nuclear weapon 
system and effectively retain nuclear 
weapons well into the 2050s fit into a world 
free from nuclear weapons? What relevance 
is an instrument of such wholesale 
destructiveness to threats defined by 
complexity and interdependence?  
 
It is equally crucial to recognise that 
seemingly ‘defensive’ nuclear deterrent 
threats cannot be divorced from concrete 
plans for the actual ‘offensive’ use of 
nuclear weapons. If such threats are 
considered a ‘rational’ tool of policy then 
nuclear war itself must also be considered 
rational.4 The danger is that the Government 
assumes its nuclear deterrent threats are 
credible and that deterrence will not fail. The 
long-term consequences of nuclear use do 
not, therefore, need to be thoroughly 
analysed.5 This assumption must be 
acknowledged and we must ask under what 
circumstances would the use of British 
nuclear weapons constitute a ‘rational’ 
contribution to its security? In short, what is 
the point of Trident and the Government’s 
plans to replace it?  
 
In 2006 the House of Commons Defence 
Committee urged the Government to 
consider just such questions, including 
“whether the concept of nuclear deterrence 
remains useful in the current strategic 
environment and in the context of the 
existing and emerging threats to the security 
of the country”. It asked the Government “to 
consider whether those states and non-state 
actors posing such threats can, in reality, be 
deterred from instigating acts of aggression 
by either existing or new approaches to 
nuclear deterrence” and said “the MoD 
should explain its understanding of the 
purpose and continuing relevance of nuclear 
deterrence now and over the lifetime of any 
potential Trident successor system”.6  
                                                     
4 William Schwartz and Charles Derber, The Nuclear 
Seduction: Why the Arms Race Doesn't Matter – and 
What Does, University of California Press, Berkeley, 
1989, p. 31. 
5 Scott Sagan, “The Commitment Trap”, International 
Security, 24(4), 2000. p. 112. 
6 The Future of the UK’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: 
the Strategic Context, House of Commons Defence 
Committee report HC 986, The Stationery Office, 
London, July 2006, p. 15. 
The Government has not addressed these 
questions. Instead it gas asserted in its 
2006 White Paper on The Future of the 
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent that 
the logic of nuclear deterrence still 
pertains in four broad areas.  
1) Deterrence against aggression towards 
British/NATO vital interests or 
nuclear coercion/blackmail by major 
powers with large nuclear arsenals. 
2) Deterrence against coercion or 
blackmail by regional ‘rogue’ states 
armed with nuclear, chemical or 
biological weapons to enable military 
intervention in the name of regional 
and global security. 
3) Deterrence against state-sponsored 
acts of nuclear terrorism. 
4) General deterrence to preserve 
regional and global security directed 
towards ‘whomever it may concern’.7  
 
British nuclear weapons are therefore not 
only meant to deter possible threats from 
other nuclear forces, but also the threat 
from chemical and biological weapons and 
general threats to British ‘vital interests’ 
anywhere in the world. This broad and 
controversial remit for nuclear weapons 
extends far beyond extreme threats to the 
survival of the nation to include the 
deterrence of threats to the security of the 
European continent, global economic 
interests based on the free flow of trade, 
overseas and foreign investment and key 
raw materials, the safety and security of 
British citizens living and working 
overseas and its Overseas Territories, and 
general international stability.8  
 
                                                     
7 Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) The Future of the 
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, Command 
6994, The Stationery Office: London, December 
2006, pp. 5, 18, 19; Geoff Hoon, “Intervening in the 
new Security Environment”, speech by the 
Secretary of State for Defence, Foreign Policy 
Centre, November 12, 2002; Jeremy Stocker, The 
United Kingdom and Nuclear Deterrence, Adelphi 
Paper 386, Routledge for IISS, London, 2007, p.33. 
8 Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review, 
Command 3999, 1998, The Stationery Office, 
London, chapter two, paras 18-20; Delivering 
Security in a Changing World, Command 6041-I, 
Ministry of Defence, London, 2003, p. 4. 
Nick Ritchie 
 
 5
The 2006 White Paper set out the 
Government’s plans to replace the current 
Trident nuclear weapon system. Britain 
currently deploys four nuclear-powered 
ballistic missile submarines and has a 
stockpile of 50 American designed and built 
Trident submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles (SLBMs) and 160 operational 
nuclear warheads. Britain has at least one 
submarine at sea at all times with up to than 
48 warheads on board. The warheads have a 
yield 100 kilotons. By comparison, the bomb 
that destroyed Hiroshima was approximately 
14kt. Britain also deploys a so-called ‘sub-
strategic’ warhead that is thought to have a 
yield of around 10kt. A few missiles on each 
submarine are probably armed with one of 
these lower yield warheads. The 
Government declared that a decision was 
needed in 2007 because the four submarines 
are aging and will need to be replaced if 
Britain is to continue to deploy nuclear 
weapons. In fact building a new fleet of 
submarines for the Trident missiles will 
allow Britain to deploy nuclear weapons 
well into the 2050s. Decisions on a 
replacement nuclear warhead and 
replacement missile will come later. The 
decision to begin the process of replacing 
the Trident system and building new 
submarines was endorsed by Parliament in 
March 2007.9  
 
When pushed a little further about the 
relevance of British nuclear weapons to 
national security the Government reverts to a 
fall-back position that it is impossible to 
know what the future holds and therefore it 
would be ‘prudent’ to keep nuclear weapons 
just in case, regardless of the political and 
economic costs.10 In this uncertain and 
complex international security environment 
it seems that the Labour Government and the 
wider British defence establishment is 
certain about one thing: having the 
capability to annihilate potential enemies 
with nuclear weapons is an essential part of 
the solution to dealing with future security 
threats. Questions about exactly how British 
                                                     
9 For a detailed analysis of the nature of the decision 
taken by Parliament see Nick Ritchie, Trident: The 
Deal Isn’t Done, BDRC Briefing Paper, University of 
Bradford, Bradford, December 2007. 
10 National Security Strategy, Cabinet Office, pp. 31, 
44. 
nuclear weapons can and will contribute to 
British and international security beyond 
the mere assertions that they do are 
deflected by the Government’s policy of 
‘deliberate ambiguity’ about the 
conditions under which Britain might 
contemplate using nuclear weapons. This 
ambiguity is based on the argument that 
further clarity might somehow “simplify 
the calculations of a potential aggressor” 
and it prevents a solid assessment of 
probable nuclear threats and appropriate 
responses.11  
 
The truism that the future is unpredictable 
cannot be disputed, but does this provide a 
sound basis for keeping nuclear weapons? 
Defence analyst Michael Fitzsimmons 
warns that overemphasising future 
uncertainty risks “clouding the rational 
basis for making strategic choices”. Whilst 
accepting that the future will be full of 
surprises, “uncertainty must be considered 
within the context of an environment 
where some significant threats are 
relatively clear and where known 
contingencies are important to plan for”.12 
We may not know what the future holds, 
but we can certainly outline robust 
parameters and undertake a detailed 
analysis of the relevance of nuclear 
deterrent threats in the four areas set out 
by the Government, which is the intent of 
this briefing paper. To nuclear advocates 
who ask what if your assessment is wrong, 
what if we find ourselves in situation 
wishing we had nuclear weapons, the 
answer must be to insist they demonstrate 
how British nuclear weapons can and will 
contribute to British and international 
security and why 180 of the world’s 
nations are content to live with future 
uncertainty without wrapping themselves 
in a nuclear security blanket. 
                                                     
11 MOD and FOC, United Kingdom’s Nuclear 
Deterrent, p. 18. 
12 Michael Fitzsimmons, “The Problem of 
Uncertainty in Strategic Planning”, Survival, 48(4), 
Winter 2006-07, pp. 131, 134. 
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1. Deterrence 
The White Paper set out a case for why 
the UK should keep its nuclear capability 
after Trident and why nuclear weapons are 
still essential to the long-term security of 
the country. The case hinges on the 
concept of nuclear deterrence and the idea 
that nuclear weapons provide a form of 
‘insurance’ or a guarantee of protection 
against nuclear threats from other 
countries. If we can threaten to annihilate 
country X with nuclear weapons then X 
won’t threaten us with nuclear attack in 
the first place. If we decide to intervene in 
a conflict against country X with our 
conventional military forces then X won’t 
use nuclear weapons against us, or even 
other ‘weapons of mass destruction’ such 
as biological or chemical weapons, 
because we can threaten a nuclear attack 
in return.  
 
Deterrence in international politics is 
therefore generally understood as a 
process in which one state successfully 
persuades another not to undertake or to 
halt a particular course of aggressive 
action. This can be achieved by 
threatening a devastating response in 
retaliation for aggression (deterrence by 
punishment) or by threatening a pre-
emptive attack that degrades or eliminates 
the ability to undertake aggressive actions 
(deterrence by denial). The threat to 
punish aggressive actions before or after 
they take place is designed to change the 
aggressor’s calculation of the costs and 
benefits of those actions to the extent that 
the aggressor desists. 13 Nuclear deterrence 
is generally understood as the threat of 
nuclear attack to deter aggressive actions 
                                                     
13 The Future of the UK’s Strategic Nuclear 
Deterrent: The White Paper: The Government’s 
Response to the Committee’s Ninth Report of 2006-
07, House of Commons Defence Committee report 
HC 551, The Stationary Office, London, May 22, 
2007, p. 5. 
and it requires an assured means of 
delivering and detonating nuclear weapons 
against an adversary in times of crisis. 
Nuclear deterrence theory has generally 
been divided into to camps: deterrence 
based on massive nuclear retaliation that 
“appeals to the fear of suffering the 
unlimited sanction of a general nuclear 
attack” and deterrence based on limited 
nuclear retaliation that does not threaten 
the wholesale destruction of the 
adversary.14 A distinction is generally 
drawn between deterrence as a process in 
which hostile actions are prevented, and 
coercion as a process in which an actor is 
compelled through fear to undertake a 
particular action.15  
 
Standard deterrence theory also argues 
that deterrent threats need not be specific 
since even a modest chance of a pre-
emptive or retaliatory nuclear attack can 
have a significant deterrent effect.16 
Deterrent targets may, for example, 
include military elements (bases, forces, 
command assets); civilian infrastructure 
(power grid, transportation, fuel or water); 
regime assets (instruments of control, 
public and private assets); or the state 
itself (target through conquest, occupation 
and restructuring).17  
                                                     
14 Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The 
Search for Credibility, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1990, pp. 3, 17; Lawrence 
Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 
Macmillan Press, Basingstoke, 1989. 
15 Michael Quinlan, “Deterrence and Deterrability”, 
in Ian Kenyon and John Simpson (eds), Deterrence 
and the New Global Security Environment, 
Routledge, London, 2006; Jeremy Stocker, The 
United Kingdom and Nuclear Deterrence, Adelphi 
Paper 386, Routledge for IISS, London, 2007, p.44. 
16 Michael Quinlan, “Deterrence and Deterrability”, 
pp. 4-6. 
17 Non-Nuclear Strategic Deterrence of State and 
Non-State Adversaries, DFI International for the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Washington, 
D.C., October 2001, p. 18. 
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There are also competing views about the 
application of nuclear deterrent threats. 
Some, such as former US Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara, argue that 
nuclear weapons are only good to 
deterring nuclear threats. He stated in 
1983 that “nuclear weapons serve no 
military purpose whatsoever. They are 
totally useless – except only to deter one’s 
opponent from using them”.18 Others, 
including the British government, argue 
that nuclear deterrent threats can deter 
attacks with chemical and biological 
weapons and to defend a range of ‘vital 
interests’ set out above.19 In its 2006 
White Paper on Trident replacement the 
Government stated that one of the reasons 
for retaining nuclear weapons was that 
“most industrialised countries have the 
capability to develop chemical and 
biological weapons.”20 In the build up to 
the 2003 Iraq War defence secretary Geoff 
Hoon also claimed that Britain was 
prepared to use nuclear weapons in 
response to the use of chemical or 
biological weapons by Iraqi forces.21 It is 
crucial to acknowledge that nuclear 
weapons can cause levels of destruction 
far beyond chemical and biological 
weapons, although advances in 
biotechnology present dangerous new 
opportunities for highly destructive 
biological weapons. It is in many ways 
misleading and unhelpful to link these 
three types of weapon under the umbrella 
term of weapons of mass destruction.22 
                                                     
18 Robert McNamara, “The Military Role of 
Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and 
Misperceptions”, Foreign Affairs, 62(1), 1983, p. 
79. 
19 On competing views see Michael Krepon, 
Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile Defense and 
the Nuclear Future, Palgrave Macmillan, New 
York, 2003, pp. 106-111. 
20 Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) The Future of the 
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, Command 
6994, The Stationery Office: London, December 
2006. 
21 Transcript from the Jonathan Dimbleby 
Programme, 24 March 2001 cited in Paul Rogers, 
Iraq: Consequences of a War, Oxford Research 
Group, October 2002. 
22 George Perkovich, “Deconflating ‘WMD’”, 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Report 
No. 17, Stockholm, October 2004. 
 
There are a number of problems with the 
Government’s ‘insurance’ analogy for 
nuclear deterrence. Insurance is 
commonly understood to involve a 
contract or agreement in which one party 
agrees to indemnify another for loss that 
occurs under the terms of the contract. 
Nuclear weapons provide no such 
guarantee of reimbursement. As the 
Acronym Institute for Disarmament 
Diplomacy argued in 2006, “Likening 
Trident to an insurance policy taps into 
people’s fears of the unknown or 
unexpected and portrays nuclear weapons 
as if they were passively waiting in the 
wings ‘just in case’. It ignores the fact that 
they might themselves have influence on 
the formation or acceleration of potential 
threats or hazards.”23 What investment in 
nuclear weapons can do, according to the 
logic of deterrence, is buy down the 
probability of being threatened with 
nuclear attack by threatened to retaliate in 
kind. Yet even this seemingly straight 
forward cause-and-effect equation is 
problematic because deterrence is not an 
exact science and success is far from 
assured for a number of reasons. 
 
First, simply deploying a ‘deterrent’ does 
not automatically ensure that others will 
be ‘deterred’ because deterrence is a 
process in which varying degrees of 
military threats are implicitly or explicitly 
communicated to an adversary who 
decides whether or not to be deterred. It is 
not a quality intrinsic to nuclear weapons 
as material objects and the Government is 
misleading when it refers to British 
nuclear weapons as ‘the deterrent’.24  
 
Second, successful deterrence rests 
fundamentally on the perceived credibility 
of the deterrent threat both in the eyes of 
the deterring state and the deteree. If 
nuclear deterrent threats lack credibility 
                                                     
23 Rebecca Johnson, Nicola Butler and Stephen 
Pullinger, Worse Than Irrelevant? British Nuclear 
Weapons in the 21st Century”, Acronym Institute 
2006, p. 18. 
24 Stocker, Nuclear Deterrence, p. 43. 
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they will be increasingly ineffective.25 A 
2001 report for the Pentagon’s Defence 
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), for 
example, argues that if nuclear threats are 
not judged to be credible then “deterrence 
based on nuclear options is unlikely to 
significantly affect the risk calculations of 
WMD-armed adversaries, especially if 
they are particularly risk-acceptant”.26 
Credible threats require the capability and 
robust plans to deliver a devastating 
attack; the political will to act given 
perceived interests at stake; the ability to 
communicate this capability and will to an 
aggressor; and an understanding of what 
will can be expected to deter a particular 
aggressor; and depends on the legitimacy 
and proportionality of a retaliatory or pre-
emptive nuclear response to aggressive 
actions.27 Deterrence is unlikely to work if 
a state or non-state actor such as a terrorist 
group is determined to carry out 
aggressive actions; if it does not consider 
a deterrent threat to be credible; if it thinks 
it can survive an attack and is prepared to 
absorb a retaliatory or pre-emptive strike; 
is unmoved by the potential devastation 
that may follow their actions; or thinks it 
can eliminate the deterrent threat by 
destroying an opponent’s military forces 
first. In these circumstances Professor 
Scott Sagan argues that “defence, not 
deterrence, would be necessary when 
confronting irrational enemies who either 
welcome a nuclear apocalypse or are, for 
whatever reason, oblivious to any level of 
threatened destruction”.28 The British 
government says that its ‘sub-strategic’ 
Trident warheads are designed to lend 
extra credibility to threats of nuclear 
retaliation so that a potential aggressor 
could not “judge that they could act with 
impunity towards the UK because they felt 
that we would be unwilling to deploy the 
                                                     
25 Non-Nuclear Strategic Deterrence, DFI 
International, p. 15. 
26 Ibid., p. 15. 
27 Quinlan, “Deterrence and Deterrability”, pp. 4-6; 
Wyn Bowen, “Deterrence and Asymmetry: Non-
State Actors and Mass Casualty Terrorism”, in Ian 
Kenyon and John Simpson (eds), Deterrence and 
the New Global Security Environment, Routledge, 
London, 2006, pp. 50-51; Sagan, “Commitment 
Trap”, pp. 97-98. 
28 Sagan, “Commitment Trap”, p. 106. 
maximum destructive effect possible with 
the Trident system”.29  
 
The credibility of nuclear threats was 
questioned repeatedly throughout the Cold 
War and different states, regimes, and 
leaders may interpret the dynamics of 
nuclear deterrence and the credibility of 
nuclear threats quite differently in a given 
situation leading to misunderstandings and 
miscalculation. One unnerving solution to 
the problems of articulating credible 
nuclear deterrent threats is the ‘madman 
theory’ whereby a state leadership 
deliberately acts so as to appear irrational, 
crazy, dangerous and liable to escalate a 
crisis or conflict to nuclear use if 
provoked, even if the use of nuclear 
weapon appears wholly disproportionate. 
Jeremi Suri and Scott Sagan have 
examined President Nixon’s attempt to 
end the Vietnam War by convincing the 
Soviet Union and North Vietnamese that 
he was out of control and prepared to use 
nuclear weapons.30  
 
Third, nuclear deterrence is not a rational, 
objective and logical theory. During the 
Cold War the absence of empirical 
evidence about the functioning of nuclear 
deterrence and the use of nuclear weapons 
in conflict allowed ‘rational’ theories of 
nuclear deterrence based on probabilistic 
game theory to dominate nuclear doctrine 
and criteria for credible nuclear deterrent 
threats. However, these theories are not 
value free and technocratic because the 
criteria for ‘credible’ nuclear deterrent 
threats in terms of the quantity and types 
of nuclear weapons and strategies for 
using them are based on subjective 
political judgements.31  In the United 
States these ‘rational’ theories  in fact 
reflected distinct ideas and understandings 
about nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union, 
                                                     
29 The Government’s Response to the Committee’s 
Ninth Report, The Stationery Office, p. 7. 
30 Scott Sagan and Jeremi Suri, ‘The Madman 
Nuclear Alert’, International Security, 27(4), Spring 
2003;  Jeremi Suri, ‘The Nukes of October: Richard 
Nixon’s Secret Plan to Bring Peace to Vietnam’, 
Wired Magazine, 16(3), March 2008.  
31 See Michael MccGwire, ‘Deterrence: The 
Problem – Not the Solution’, Journal of Strategic 
Studies, 9(4), December 1986. 
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vulnerability to attack, a tendency to 
“fantasize about Soviet military power” 
and haphazard construction of problems 
affecting nuclear strategy and the 
solutions required (usually new 
weapons).32 Lawrence, for example, 
argues that the Cold War witnessed a 
“scientization of nuclear strategy” based 
on an illusion of precision and exactness.33 
The ‘rationality’ of Cold War deterrence 
models also obscured the idea that 
deterrent threats may have the reverse 
effect of galvanising the deteree to resist 
the deterrer for issues of national pride 
and domestic or international status.34 
 
In the United States the George W. Bush 
administration expressed considerable loss 
of confidence in America’s ability to deter 
WMD-armed ‘rogue’ states with its Cold 
War-era nuclear weapons.35 Its 2001 
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) declared 
that traditional Cold War-era nuclear 
deterrent threats were no longer credible 
for unpredictable ‘rogues’ that might 
collaborate with terrorist groups to inflict 
massive damage on the US or its vital 
interests, particularly after the attacks of 
9/11.36  The solution set out in the NPR 
                                                     
32 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear 
Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of 
Armageddon, 1989, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, pp. 38, 183; Robert Jervis, The Illogic of 
American Nuclear Strategy, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, 1984, p. 54. 
33 Philip Lawrence, “Strategic Beliefs, Mythology 
and Imagery”, in Little, R. and Smith, S. (eds.), 
Belief Systems and International Relations, Basil 
Blackwell Inc, Oxford, 1988, p. 143. 
34 US Coercion in a World of Proliferating and 
Varied WMD Capabilities: Final Report for the 
Project on Deterrence and Cooperation in  a Multi-
tiered Nuclear World, DFI International/SPARTA, 
Inc, for the Defence Threat Reduction Agency, 
Washington, D.C., February 2001, p. 21. 
35 Excerpts available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/d
od/npr.htm. See Statement of Douglas J. Feith 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Hearing 
before the Senate Committee on National Security, 
February 14, 2002, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 
36 Excerpts available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/d
od/npr.htm. See Statement of Douglas J. Feith 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Hearing 
before the Senate Committee on National Security, 
February 14, 2002, U.S. Government Printing 
was a set of new capabilities that could be 
used for pre-emptive attacks, including 
strategic defences such as extensive 
ballistic and cruise missile defences as 
well as space and cyber defences; an 
Advanced Concepts Initiative to study 
earth penetrating and low-yield nuclear 
warhead designs; conventional strategic 
weapons such as conventionally-armed 
Trident missiles; and a revitalised nuclear 
weapons production complex to design 
and deploy new or modified nuclear 
warheads as needed.37 This approach was 
integrated into defence planning and 
reinforced in the 2004 National Military 
Strategy of the United States.38  
 
The right to engage in pre-emptive 
counter-proliferation missions was 
asserted by the administration in its 
September 2002 National Security 
Strategy and December 2002 National 
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction.39 This included options for 
pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons in 
response to the threat of nuclear, chemical 
or biological weapons attack, despite 
administration denials.40 The new 
approach also led to a new rapid reaction 
                                                                      
Office, Washington, D.C.; Testimony of Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Hearing 
before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 4 
October 2001, Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 
37 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force 
on Future Strategic Strike Forces, February 2004, 
Washington, D.C., Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition and Technology, U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2004, p. 5.11. 
38 The National Military Strategy of the United 
States: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for 
Tomorrow, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, 
D.C., 2004, p. 13. 
39 The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America, The White House, Washington, 
D.C., 2002; National Strategy to Combat Weapons 
of Mass Destruction, The White House, 
Washington, D.C., 2002. 
40 See Philip Bleek, “Bush Administration 
Reaffirms Negative Security Assurances”, Arms 
Control Today, 32(2), (March 2002); Joint Doctrine 
for Nuclear Operations (draft), U.S. Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2005, Washington, D.C., pp. III-2, p.13; New 
Nuclear Policies, New Weapons, New Dangers, 
Arms Control Association, Washington, D.C., 2003. 
Retrieved from 
<http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/newnuclear
weaponsissuebrief.asp> on 18 March 2007. 
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‘global strike’ mission assigned to U.S. 
Strategic Command.41 STRATCOM’s 
mission was now to “provide a global 
warfighting capability…to deter and 
defeat those who desire to attack the 
United States and its allies” with a host of 
strategic conventional as well as nuclear 
options.42 Critics, including former 
Secretary of Defense William Perry, 
former Senator Sam Nunn and former 
STRATCOM commander Eugene 
Habiger, argued that these developments 
would expand options for nuclear attacks 
and take nuclear weapons policy in a 
radically new and possibly destabilising 
direction.43 
                                                     
41 J. D. Crouch, Special Briefing on the Nuclear 
Posture Review, 9 January 2002, U.S. Department 
of Defense, Washington, D.C., Retrieved from 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t0109
2002_t0109npr.html> on 2 March 2007; Nuclear 
Posture Review (Excerpts), Globalsecurity.org, 
Washington, D.C. , 2002. Retrieved from 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/
dod/npr.htm> on November 24, 2004, p. 29. 
42 Testimony of Adm. James O. Ellis, USN, 
Commander in Chief, United States Strategic 
Command on Command Posture and Strategic 
Issues, Hearing before the Senate Committee on 
Armed Services on, 8 April 2003, Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., p. 9. 
43 Habiger, E. E., Nunn, S. and Perry, W., ‘Still 
Missing: A Nuclear Strategy’, The Washington 
Post, 21 May 2002; Jeffrey Knopf, ‘Nuclear 
Tradeoffs: Conflicts Between U.S. National 
Security and Global Nonproliferation Efforts’, in 
Wirtz, J. J. and Larsen, J. A. (eds.), Nuclear 
Transformation: The New U.S. Nuclear Doctrine, 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 162-170. 
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2. Deterring Major Nuclear Powers 
The Government’s first area of deterrence 
for British nuclear weapons is to deter 
aggression by major nuclear powers and 
prevent major wars that may threaten the 
survival of the nation. No major direct 
nuclear threat currently exists and, 
according to the Government, hasn’t for a 
decade since at least 1998.44 Prime 
Minster Tony Blair accepted that the 
prediction “that there is no possibility of 
nuclear confrontation with any major 
nuclear power…is probably right”45 but 
argued that such a threat might re-emerge 
over the next 20-50 years.46  
 
Only two nuclear-armed major powers, 
Russia and China, are likely to have the 
capability and conceivably the intention in 
the future to threaten Britain and Western 
Europe with nuclear weapons. The 
primary focus, however, is deterrence of a 
future resurgent and aggressive Russia, 
which still deploys thousands of nuclear 
weapons.47 The Government has justified 
replacement of Trident by pointing to the 
continued existence of large nuclear 
arsenals that are being modernised.48 This 
reflects an important part of NATO’s 
justification for remaining a nuclear-
armed alliance, which states that “The 
existence of powerful nuclear forces 
outside the Alliance constitutes a 
significant factor which the Alliance has 
to take into account if security and 
stability in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be 
maintained” – namely Russia.49  
                                                     
44 The National Security Strategy of the United 
Kingdom, Cm 7291, Cabinet Office, London, p. 12. 
45 Tony Blair, ‘Parliamentary Statement on 
Trident’, December 4, 32006, Prime Minster’s 
Office, London. 
46 MOD and FCO, United Kingdom’s Nuclear 
Deterrent, p. 19. 
47 Ibid., p. 14 
48 Ibid., p. 14. 
49 “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept”, NATO Press 
Release, NATO, Brussels, April 23, 1999. 
During the Cold War Britain sought to 
deter aggressive actions by the Soviet 
Union by threatening to destroy a handful 
of Russian cities, in particular Moscow.50 
If a resurgent, aggressive and nuclear-
armed Russian leadership comes to power 
it may threaten Europe and Britain with 
nuclear weapons. Consequently Britain 
may need a nuclear deterrent threat to 
deter an attack as it did during the Cold 
War based on the ‘logic’ of nuclear 
deterrence. This rationale for retaining 
British nuclear weapons is therefore based 
on the assumptions that: 1) The Soviet 
Union/Russia was successfully deterred 
with the threat of nuclear attack, including 
from British nuclear weapons, during the 
Cold War and can be deterred with 
nuclear weapons again if necessary; 2) 
There is a genuine risk that a resurgent 
and aggressive Russia or China will 
threaten Britain or Europe with nuclear 
weapons over the coming decades. 
 
Deterring the Soviet 
Union/Russia and British 
Nuclear Weapons 
The first assumption is plagued by 
problems. First, the Cold War nuclear 
confrontation was not a stable, predictable 
relationship of assured destruction. It was 
highly dangerous, plagued by uncertainty 
with very serious risks of a major 
inadvertent nuclear exchange through 
accident or miscalculation.51 Fear of a 
                                                     
50 Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, Planning 
Armageddon, Harwood Academic Publishers, 
Singapore,  2000. 
51 Paul Rogers, Losing Control, Pluto Press, 2000, 
pp. 11-38; Shaun Gregory, The Hidden Cost of 
Deterrence: Nuclear Weapons Accidents, Brassey’s 
UK, London, 1990; Scott Sagan, The Limits of 
Safety:  Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear 
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surprise nuclear first strike that could 
decimate a state’s nuclear arsenal led to 
technological, political and military 
pressure for ever more numbers and types 
of nuclear weapons until the Soviet and 
American nuclear arsenals reached absurd 
proportions. Constant concerns about the 
perceived credibility of the threat to use 
nuclear weapons in the face of aggression, 
domestic political pressures, competing 
interpretations of the other side’s actions 
and regular exaggerations of the other’s 
capabilities and intentions led to repeated 
revisions of nuclear strategy.52  
 
American and British nuclear deterrent 
threats were not defensive and benign but 
often provocative and at times highly 
destabilising and self-fulfilling as 
supposedly defensive actions were 
mistaken for aggressive intentions.53 For 
former Royal Navy Commander Robert 
Green “the arms build-ups, threatening 
military deployments, and the 
confrontational rhetoric that characterised 
the strategy of deterrence effectively 
obscured deep-seated mutual fear of war. 
This reckless behaviour was self-
defeating, provoking precisely the 
response it was designed to prevent.”54  
 
Second, it was often assumed that the 
Soviet leadership shared Western 
understandings of nuclear deterrence. 
However, as Professor Allen Lynch of the 
University of Virginia argues, Cold War 
deterrence principles were developed 
                                                                      
Weapons, Princeton University Press, 1993; 
Michael Wallace, Brian Crissey and Linn  Sennott, 
‘Accidental Nuclear War: A Risk Assessment’, 
Journal of Peace Research, 1986, 23(1), pp. 9-27; 
Bruce Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, 
The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1993. 
52 Michael MccGwire, ‘Is there a future for nuclear 
weapons’, International Affairs, 70(2), 1994, p. 
228. 
53 James Lebovic, Deterring International 
Terrorism and Rogue States, Routledge, London, 
2007, p. 5; Stephen Cimbala, Nuclear strategizing – 
Deterrence and reality, Praeger Publishers, New 
York, 1988, p. 21; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice 
Gross Stein, We all lost the Cold War, Princeton 
University Press, 1994, p. 92. 
54 Robert Green, The Naked Nuclear Emperor, The 
Disarmament and Security Centre, Christchurch, 
New Zealand, 2000, p. 51. 
largely by American civilians in 
abstraction “both from the daily world of 
the military professional and from the 
specifics of Russian-Soviet political-
military culture”.55 They were not 
objective, rational, universal postulates but 
“highly problematic”, according to James 
Lebovic, and “based on heroic 
assumptions about the adversary – its 
ability to think dispassionately, process 
information, and make the ‘right’ decision 
under the most challenging of conditions”. 
56 The dangers of assuming a common 
understanding of unclear deterrence were 
highlighted in 1998 by the former head of 
America’s Strategic Command, General 
Lee Butler: “While we clung to the notion 
that nuclear war could be reliably 
deterred, Soviet leaders derived from their 
historical experience the conviction that 
such a war might be thrust upon them and 
if so, must not be lost. Driven by that fear, 
they took Herculean measures to fight and 
survive no matter the odds or the costs. 
Deterrence was a dialogue of the blind 
with the deaf”.57  
 
This created an enduring danger of 
inadvertent nuclear war resulting from a 
combination of the background hostility of 
the Cold War, mutual misunderstandings 
and an unforeseen chain of events.58 The 
unstable, high-stakes, dialogue of the 
blind with the deaf led to a number of 
potentially catastrophic near-misses that 
could have led to inadvertent nuclear 
Armageddon.59 These include the 1962 
Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1983 NATO 
Able Archer exercise in which NATO 
preparations for a simulated nuclear war 
                                                     
55 Allen Lynch, ‘The Soviet Union: Nuclear 
Weapons and their Role in Security Policy’, in 
Karp, R. C., Security with Nuclear Weapons?, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991, p. 101. 
56 Lebovic, Deterring International Terrorism and 
Rogue States, p. 4. 
57 Lee Butler, “The Risks of Nuclear Deterrence: 
From Superpowers to Rogue Leaders”, speech to 
the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 
February 2, 1998. 
58 Michael MccGwire, evidence to the House of 
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report on 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, report HC 407, The 
Stationery Office, London, July 2000, appendix 13. 
59 Lebovic, Deterring International Terrorism and 
Rogue States, p. 4. 
Nick Ritchie 
 
 13 
were interpreted by Moscow as the real 
thing and an incident five years after the 
end of the Cold War in 1995 when a 
Norwegian weather rocket was 
misinterpreted by Russian early warning 
systems as an American Trident nuclear 
missile and Moscow reportedly came 
within minutes of launching a nuclear 
counter-attack.60 
 
Third, standard nuclear deterrence theory 
insists that nuclear deterrent threats 
prevented the Cold War turning hot and 
will continue to prevent war between the 
major powers. It is based on the Western 
image of the Soviet Union as a relentlessly 
expansionist empire intent on subverting 
Western capitalism and democracy and 
imposing its particular authoritarian brand 
of Marxism-Leninism around the world by 
force where possible, including the use of 
nuclear weapons.61 This is a questionable 
assertion founded on the underlying 
assumption that without nuclear deterrent 
threats the major powers would have 
“allowed their various crises to escalate if 
all they had to fear at the end of the 
escalatory ladder was something like a 
repetition of World War II”.62 But a 
number of important works now argue that 
the sheer scale of destruction that 
accompanied World War II through 
conventional weaponry was sufficient to 
deter future global war between the major 
industrialised powers.63 As Professor John 
Mueller argues, “few with the experience 
of World War II behind them would 
contemplate its repetition with anything 
other than horror. Even before the 
[nuclear] bomb had been perfected, world 
war had become spectacularly costly and 
destructive, killing some 50 million 
                                                     
60 Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining 
the Cuban Missile Crisis, Little Brown, Boston, 
1971; David Hoffman, ‘Cold War Doctrines Refuse 
to Die’, Washington Post, March 15, 1998; Peter 
Pry, War Scare: Russia and America and the 
Nuclear Brink, Praeger, 1999. 
61 See Michael MccGwire, “The Paradigm that Lost 
its Way”, Foreign Affairs, 77(4), October 2001. 
62 John Mueller, “The Essential Irrelevance of 
Nuclear Weapons”, International Security 13(2), 
Fall 1988, p. 66. 
63 Michael MccGwire, “Is There a Future for 
Nuclear Weapons?”, International Affairs, 70(2), 
1994, p. 218. 
worldwide”.64 Furthermore, the only 
countries capable of creating another 
world war were its victors, each of which 
emerged relatively content with the status 
quo following the division of Europe as 
the dust of the World War II settled. 
Disputes and crises would certainly arise, 
but neither the USA nor the USSR has 
grievances so essential as to risk another 
world war.65  
 
This is backed by Lee Butler who argues 
that “nuclear weapons did not and will 
not, of themselves, prevent major wars, 
and their presence unnecessarily 
prolonged and intensified the Cold War. 
In today’s environment, the threat of use 
has been exposed as neither credible nor 
of any military utility. In Korea, in the 
Formosa Strait, in Indochina, and in the 
Persian Gulf, presidents, – Democratic 
and Republican – have categorically 
rejected the use of nuclear weapons, even 
in the face of grave provocation.”66 In fact 
Ambassador George Kennan, who in 1946 
first articulated the doctrine of long-term 
military and political containment of the 
Soviet Union as part of a new Cold War, 
concluded in 1984 that the Soviet Union 
had no interest in overrunning Western 
Europe militarily and that it would not 
have launched an attack on Europe in the 
decades after World War II even if nuclear 
weapons did not exist.67 The image of a 
Soviet empire set on world domination 
was further undermined by America’s 
2002 National Security Strategy that 
described the USSR as “a generally status 
quo, risk-averse adversary”.68 
 
                                                     
64 Mueller, “Essential Irrelevance”, p. 57. 
65 Mueller, “Essential Irrelevance”, p. 58; see also 
Michael MccGwire, “The Elimination of Nuclear 
Weapons” in Baylis, J. and O’Neill, R., Alternative 
Nuclear Futures, Oxford University Pres, Oxford, 
2004, pp. 144-166. 
66 Lee Butler, “Zero Tolerance”, Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, January/February 2000, p. 72. 
67 George Kennan, “American Policy toward Russia 
on the Eve of the 1984 Presidential Election”, in At 
a Century’s Ending: Reflections 1982-1995, W.W. 
Norton & Company, New York, 1996, p. 105. Cited 
in Green, The Naked Nuclear Emperor, p. 38. 
68 The National Security Strategy, The White 
House, 2002, p. 15. 
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Fourth, British nuclear weapons were 
largely peripheral to Soviet nuclear 
strategy. Moscow was primarily 
concerned with preventing a nuclear 
attack by America, not by the UK or for 
that matter France. These much smaller 
nuclear forces were considered part of the 
overall Western threat to the Soviet Union 
and Warsaw Pact that was dominated by 
American conventional and strategic 
nuclear weaponry. 69 As Christopher Bluth 
concluded in his study of Soviet-British 
relations since the 1970s, “Soviet military 
and political authors do not pay any great 
attention to these rationales for the British 
independent nuclear deterrent”.70 This 
continues today with a discourse on post-
Cold War nuclear weapons dynamics at 
the major power level that invariably 
focuses on a tri-polar relationship between 
Russia, America and China. British and 
French nuclear capabilities are an 
afterthought.71 
 
A Future Russian Nuclear 
Threat? 
The second assumption about future 
Russian/Chinese strategic nuclear threats 
is also problematic. The logic of the 
Government’s argument is that Russia still 
has nuclear weapons so an existential 
nuclear threat to the UK and Europe still 
exists and we must therefore keep nuclear 
weapons. This logic obscures the fact that 
the Soviet Union was perceived in the 
West as an ideologically driven, 
aggressive, expansionist empire. Today’s 
context, and the future context projecting 
                                                     
69 Raymond Garthoff, Deterrence and the 
Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine, Brookings 
Institution Press, Washington D.C., 1990; Robin 
Laird and Susan Clark, ‘Soviet Perspectives on 
British Security Policy’, in Laird, R. and Clark, S. 
(eds), The USSR and the Western Alliance,. Boston 
Unwin Hyman, 1990, p. 132. 
70 Christopher Bluth, “The Security Dimension”, in 
Pravda, A. and Duncan, P., “Soviet-British 
Relations since the 1970s”, Cambridge University 
Pres, Cambridge, 1990, p. 97 
71 See Brad Roberts, Nuclear Polarity and Stability, 
Institute for Defense Analysis for the Defense 
Threat Reduction Agency, Alexandria, VA, 
November 2000, p. 12. 
forward, is radically different. In fact the 
overall trend in relations with both 
countries has been extremely positive 
since the end of the Cold War and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and 
following a resumption of relations with 
Beijing in the early 1990s after the 
Tiananmen Square massacre.  
 
Russia foreign minister Sergei Lavrov 
stated in 2007 that after the Cold War 
Russia “renounced an ideology of imperial 
and other ‘great plans’ in favour of 
pragmatism and common sense”.72 Robert 
Levgold, professor of political science at 
Columbia University, similarly finds that a 
new Cold War is the least realistic of 
future possible paths between Russia and 
the West: “the animus is missing. The 
relationship has neither a profound 
ideological underpinning, nor is it 
menaced by far-reaching aggressive aims 
on one or both sides”.73  Soviet President 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s insistence that 
Soviet/Russia prosperity must be based on 
the principles of cooperative security and 
Russian President Yeltsin’s embrace of 
capitalism has been steadily 
institutionalised since the late 1980s.74 As 
Sergei Lavrov stated in 2007 “Russia 
concedes to the generally held belief that 
democracy and the market must make up 
the basis of the socio-political system and 
economic life. There is no doubt that we 
are at the beginning of this path and are 
still far away from an ideal situation. But 
the development vector has been chosen – 
and chosen irrevocably”.75 Russia is now 
integrated into the globalised international 
economy, is in final talks to join the 
World Trade Organisation and is 
dependent on European and Western 
markets. It is now tied into a range of 
international political and economic 
agreements and institutions including the 
1975 Helsinki Final Act and its 
                                                     
72 Sergei Lavrov, “Containing Russia: Back to the 
Future?”, Russia in Global Affairs, no. 4 Oct-Dec 
2007, p. 1. 
73 Robert Levgold, “U.S.-Russian relations: An 
American perspective”, Russia in Global Affairs, 
no. 4 Oct-Dec 2006. 
74 Richard Rhodes, Arsenals of Folly: The Making 
of the Nuclear Arms Race, Knopf, New York, 2007. 
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Organisation for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE); the G8 which it joined 
in 1997; and a major Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the 
EU.  
 
The British government has repeatedly 
stated that close engagement with Russia 
is essential and that “where obstacles and 
disagreements exist, our aim will continue 
to be to seek to resolve them by means of 
a transparent, open and honest dialogue”.76 
Nearly ten years ago former Prime 
Minister Tony Blair’s asserted that “we 
will all benefit hugely from a thriving 
Russia making use of its immense natural 
resources, its huge internal market and its 
talented and well-educated people. 
Russia’s past has been as a world power 
that we felt confronted by. We must work 
with her to make her future as a world 
power with whom we co-operate in trust 
and to mutual benefit”.77 As an example 
how just how much has changed since the 
end of the Cold War, in May 2006 the 
RAF’s Rugby League team played against 
the Russian Space Forces in the ‘closed’ 
city of Krasnoznamensk which hosts a 
mission control centre for military 
satellites (the RAF lost).78 It is also clear 
that Britain’s policies and actions are not a 
priority for Russia in Europe where 
Germany and France that are seen to be at 
the heart of the EU.79 
 
Russia is, and can be expected to remain, 
broadly satisfied with the current 
                                                     
76 ‘Written evidence by the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office’, Global Security: Russia, 
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 
report HC 51, The Stationery Office: London, 
November 2007, Ev. 77; “The Big Freeze”, The 
Economist, July 19, 2007. 
77 Tony Blair, “Doctrine of the International 
Community”, speech at the Economic Club, 
Chicago, April 24, 1999. 
78 “Behind the iron curtain: an RAF Rugby League 
special feature”, Defence News, 8 May 2006. 
Available at 
<www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/Peop
leInDefence/BehindTheIronCurtainAnRafRugbyLe
agueSpecialFeature.htm>. 
79 Rod Thornton, “Current United Kingdom-Russia 
Security Relations”, in Smith, H (ed), The Two-
Level Game: Russia’s Relations with Great Britain 
Finland and the European Union, University of 
Helsinki: Helsinki, 2006, p. 156. 
international political status quo. Russia 
may not accept all aspects of the dominant 
Western-led international order, but it is 
not a revisionist state. The possibility of 
Moscow attempting to re-order the 
international system through military 
force, including the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons, is extremely remote. It is 
instead seeking to accommodate the 
prevailing order to fit its national interests, 
which includes constraining American 
unilateralism in variety of contexts in a 
favour of a ‘multi-polar’ world. Russia’s 
long-term integration into the global 
economy and prevailing political order 
mean that the costs of major power 
aggression are now enormous in terms of 
GDP costs to all potential parties, with or 
without nuclear deterrent threats. The UK 
Ministry of Defence’s Development, 
Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) 
argued in 2007, for example, that “Major 
interstate wars will be unlikely, because of 
the increasing economic interdependence 
of states in a globalized economy and the 
need to confront the symptoms of a 
challenging range of transnational 
problems, which will enhance the 
requirement for cooperative governance 
and action”.80 
 
At the strategic security level Britain’s 
relationship with Moscow is subsumed by 
Russia’s relationship with the EU, OSCE 
and NATO.81 Both NATO and Russia 
have accepted that engagement and 
partnership is the only sustainable path for 
lasting security. Denis Alexeev, for 
example, reports that “the majority of 
representatives of the Russia ruling elite 
and society are sure that the only correct 
choice for Russia is to strengthen its 
strategic partnership with the West”.82 In 
2005 President Vladimir Putin stated that 
“the choice made in favour of dialogue 
and cooperation with NATO was the right 
                                                     
80 Global Strategic Trends: 2007-2036, 3rd ed., 
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 
Shrivenham, January 2007, p. 67. 
81 Thornton, “Current United Kingdom-Russia 
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82 Denis Alexeev, Russia and the Security System of 
Transatlantic Security: Perspectives for the Future, 
George C. Marshall Center, Germany, September 
2006, p. 11. 
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one and ha[s] proved fruitful”.83 Russia is 
party to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding 
Act and 2002 NATO-Russia Council that 
commits both parties to a stable, peaceful 
and undivided Europe and has participated 
in NATO exercises and NATO-led joint 
operations. 
 
In 2002 NATO opened a Military Liaison 
Mission in Moscow and set out four 
confidence-building measures to engage 
Russia based on: enhancing and deepening 
dialogue on matters related to nuclear 
forces; exchanging information regarding 
the readiness status of nuclear forces; 
exchanging information on safety 
provisions and safety features of nuclear 
weapons; and exchanging data on U.S. 
and Russian sub-strategic nuclear forces.84 
Britain is also directly involved in a range 
of cooperative nuclear threat reduction 
tasks in Russia, including dismantling 
former Soviet nuclear missile 
submarines.85 
 
In 2007 the Alliance stated that “the threat 
of general war in Europe has virtually 
disappeared” and the “circumstances in 
which any use of nuclear weapons might 
have to be contemplated are extremely 
remote” and once more stressed the 
importance of consultation and 
cooperation with Russia on nuclear 
weapons.86 Former US Ambassador James 
Goodby and former member of the 
President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory 
Board and professor of theoretical physics 
Sidney Drell concur and argue that “as a 
                                                     
83 Alexeev, Russia and the Security System of 
Transatlantic Security, p. 14-16. 
84 Report on Options for Confidence and Security 
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Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament, 
NATO, Brussels, December 2000, pp. 22-25. 
85 Foreign and Commonwealth Office and 
Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform, Global Threat Reduction, Fifth Annual 
Report, February 2008, The Stationery Office: 
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practical matter, nuclear deterrence has 
essentially disappeared from NATO’s 
missions”.87 Dmitri Trenin argues that the 
same applies in Russia: “from Moscow’s 
perspective, deterring NATO’s two other 
nuclear powers, France and Britain, is 
practically no longer relevant. Russia’s 
relations with the nations of the European 
Union are de facto demilitarized”.88 
 
In America the Bush administration 
articulated a strong desire to establish “a 
new strategic framework” with Russia in 
which the balance of nuclear forces and 
the condition of mutual assured 
destruction were no longer central to their 
relationship. President Bush declared that 
he wanted to “complete the work of 
changing our relationship from one based 
on a nuclear balance of terror to one based 
on common responsibilities and common 
interests…We may have areas of 
difference with Russia, but we are not and 
must not be strategic adversaries” with 
Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld 
insisting that “the idea of an arms race 
between the United States and Russia 
today is ludicrous”.89 This was symbolised 
in the 2002 Strategic Offensive 
Reductions Treaty to reduce and limit 
American and Russia strategic nuclear 
force deployments and the May 2002 
“Joint Declaration on a New Strategic 
Relationship between Russia and the 
United States” that formally marked the 
end of “the era in which the United States 
and Russia saw each other as an enemy or 
strategic threat”.90 This was reaffirmed in 
April 2008.91  
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Nevertheless, Russian nationalism and its 
steady re-emergence as a major power 
after its post-Cold War decline will 
inevitably bring it into confrontation with 
other countries, including those in Europe, 
the Middle East, Central Asia, and China 
and the United States. This may include 
differences over the deployment of missile 
defences and the future of the US-Russian 
nuclear arms reductions process, human 
rights and authoritarian governance, 
energy supplies and access to energy 
resources in the Caspian basin, the host of 
complex military, economic and political 
disputes in the Middle East and South 
Caucasus and Western activities in the 
countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, particularly Ukraine.92 
There is also a powerful constituency in 
America that continues to view Russia as 
a rival power to be contained unless and 
until it fully aligns with the West. 
Republican presidential candidate Senator 
John McCain argued in March 2008 that 
the dangers posed by a revanchist Russia 
had to be confronted and that it should be 
excluded from the G8 because of its weak 
democratic institutions.93 
 
Russia’s elite continues to harbour 
significant suspicions about Western 
military intentions and seeks to limit and 
constrain unilateral American and Western 
actions that are perceived to undermine its 
understanding of strategic stability.94 As 
Dmitri Trenin argues, Moscow “has had to 
factor in US military interventionism; its 
unilateral missile defense program; US 
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troop deployments to former Soviet 
republics; and above all the reality of 
overwhelming US military superiority”.95 
Despite future tensions, disagreements and 
political crises, some of which may have 
military dimensions, it is barely 
conceivable that British nuclear deterrent 
threats and consideration of using nuclear 
weapons against Russia will ever be part 
of the solution to future confrontations 
given the absence of ideological enmity. 
The extent to which Russia brandishes 
nuclear threats in the future will be a 
function of its perception of Western, 
particularly NATO, strategic encirclement 
that belittles Russian interests.  Russian 
fears of a long-term containment strategy 
can only be overcome through continued 
engagement by Britain and the West and 
the integration of Russia into European 
security structures.96 
 
Russian nuclear forces are steadily being 
reduced alongside some modernisation, 
which has raised concerns in Britain.97 In 
2002 Russia and America agreed in the 
Moscow Treaty to reduce deployed 
strategic nuclear forces to between 2,200 
and 1,700 warheads. Additional warheads 
will be kept in reserve and non-strategic 
nuclear weapons are not included. Russia 
currently has an arsenal of approximately 
2,300 non-strategic nuclear forces.98 
Russia’s nuclear modernisation 
programmes are directed at ensuring 
nuclear parity with America and the 
capability to overcome American missile 
defences. Russia is modernising its 
strategic nuclear forces in part to ensure 
they don’t fall below Moscow Treaty 
levels, despite the questionable necessity 
of strategic parity with America. Both 
President Yeltsin and President Putin tried 
to negotiate greater reductions in strategic 
forces to between 1,000 and 1,500 
strategic warheads but so far this has not 
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been possible.99 It is ironic that it is 
Britain’s primary ally that has resisted 
reaching a binding agreement with Russia 
to significantly reduce strategic nuclear 
forces a 1,000 warheads or even lower. 
Russia also views American plans to 
deploy missile defence systems in Central 
Europe to complement those in the United 
States and East Asia as destabilising. 
Moscow’s fear, plausible or not, is that an 
open-ended missile defence programme 
could provide America with the capability 
to realistically threaten a decisive nuclear 
first-strike against Russia’s aging strategic 
nuclear forces and then successfully 
defend itself against a retaliatory nuclear 
attack by any surviving Russian nuclear 
forces.100  
 
Nuclear modernisation programmes 
include:  
• The silo-based SS-27 Topol-M single 
warhead inter-continental ballistic 
missile (ICBM) that was first 
deployed in 1997 and a mobile 
version (SS-27A Topol-M1) first 
deployed in 2006. It is estimated that 
50 Topol-M/M1 missiles will be 
deployed by 2015. They are replacing 
older SS-25 (Sickle) missiles first 
deployed in 1985. 
• A new multiple-warhead ICBM, the 
RS-24, first tested in May 2007 to 
replace the aging SS-18 (Satan) and 
SS-19 (Stiletto) missiles first deployed 
in 1979 and 1980 and developed in 
response to the American decision in 
2002 to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty that placed 
major limits on the Russian and 
American missile defence systems. 
• The new SS-NX-30 (Bulava) 
multiple-warhead submarine-launched 
ballistic missile (SLBM) for 
deployment aboard a new fleet of up 
to eight Borey-class ballistic missile 
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submarines. The missile’s 
development has been plagued with 
difficulty including a number of failed 
tests and only one Borey-class 
submarine has been completed and is 
expected to undergo sea trails in 2008. 
These will replace the Delta III-class 
submarines and their SS-N-18 
(Stingray) SLBMs first deployed in 
1978.  
• Modernisation of its fleet of six Delta 
IV-class ballistic missile submarines 
is being upgraded and their SS-N-23 
(Skiff) SLBMs. 
• Serial production of a modernised Tu-
160 Blackjack long-range bomber to 
replace aging Tu-95 Bear bombers 
first deployed in 1984. 101  
 
Nuclear confrontation with 
China? 
The other major power that could possibly 
threaten UK territory and vital interests 
with nuclear weapons is China. Yet 
China’s gradual rise and integration into 
the global economy, the evolution of 
China’s nuclear forces and the 
geographical location of potential regional 
security crises involving China suggest 
that British nuclear weapons have no role 
to play in its relationship with China or 
future regional crises in East Asia.  
 
As with Russia, tensions and crises will 
continue to occur over China’s many 
territorial disputes with its neighbours, 
most prominently over the status of 
Taiwan and islands in the South China 
Sea. China will also continue to face 
major internal economic, political, 
demographic and environmental pressures 
that will affect its regional and 
international foreign and defence policies. 
Disputes will continue over China’s 
human rights record; growing 
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conventional military capabilities and their 
impact on regional stability; trade policies; 
activities in Africa; and role in the global 
energy market. More generally there is 
concern about the impact of China’s rise 
on the current international system and a 
shift in the centre of gravity of 
international politics away from the 
Atlantic and toward the Pacific. 
 
Nevertheless, China’s history of the past 
several decades suggests that Beijing will 
continue to prioritise economic 
development and that it will continue to 
steadily integrate into the global economy 
and international political system 
exemplified by its membership of the 
World Trade Organisation in 2001, and its 
role in the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations Regional Forum (ARF) and the 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) forum.102 As the European 
Commission’s 2006 Communication EU-
China: Close Partners, Growing 
Responsibilities states “China is, with the 
EU, closely bound to the globalisation 
process and becoming more integrated 
into the international system”.103 It, like 
Russia, is relatively content with the 
international system and repeatedly 
stresses its peaceful rise and co-existence 
with the world’s major powers. It relies 
heavily on Western export markets to 
support its primary objective of economic 
growth and values economic stability 
above much else. 
 
Relations between Britain and China have 
steadily improved since the early 1990s 
after the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
massacre. Relations are in the “best shape 
ever” according to Foreign Secretary 
Margaret Beckett in 2007.104 Britain and 
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China now enjoy annual summits, Britain 
is the largest European investor in China 
with 6,000 projects worth over $15 billion 
and in 2003 the Government established a 
dedicated China Task Force. Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown declared in 
January 2008 that “I see the rise of China 
and the reality of globalisation not as a 
threat but as an opportunity” for British 
companies and greater global prosperity. 
He announced a new high-level economic 
and financial dialogue between China and 
Britain “that is more comprehensive and 
deeper than any previous dialogue 
between China and any European 
country”.105 Bilateral trade is booming, 
increasing by 111% between 2001 and 
2005.106 Britain remains a supporter of the 
‘one China’ policy with regard to Taiwan 
and it does not recognise Taiwan as a state 
or have diplomatic relations with it. 
Britain has also held two rounds of an 
annual ‘strategic dialogue’ with Chinese 
civilian and military experts, Chinese 
military officers are being trained in 
British military staff colleges and in 2004 
the Royal Navy held a joint military 
exercise with the People’s Liberation 
Army Navy, a first in military-to-military 
exchanges.107  
 
Relations between the EU and China have 
undergone a similar transformation. David 
Shambuagh writes that “the breadth and 
depth of Europe-China relations are 
impressive, and the global importance of 
the relationship ranks it as an emerging 
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axis in world affairs…a comprehensive 
and multidimensional relationship – even 
strategic partnership”.108 Since 1995 the 
European Commission has published a 
series of policy papers to guide EU ties 
with China and engage it in global 
multilateral institutions. There are 
currently twenty separate dialogues and 
working groups on a range of issues and in 
January 2007 negotiations began on a new 
EU-China Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA).109 An annual EU-
China summit to expand cooperation has 
also been held since 1998. A crucial factor 
in their burgeoning cooperation according 
to Shambaugh is “the absence of a 
‘Taiwan factor’ [that] removes a 
significant potential irritant in EU-China 
ties” and the absence of significant 
military or strategic European interests in 
East Asia.110  
 
America has also initiated a new round of 
strategic dialogue with China since 2005 
that now includes a programme of high-
level dialogue, working-level talks, 
reciprocal ship visits and other 
exchanges.111 Former Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger also made the important 
point in 2005 that “Starting with Richard 
Nixon, seven presidents have affirmed the 
importance of cooperative relations with 
China and the U.S. commitment to a one-
China policy” albeit with some temporary 
detours.112 Nevertheless, an important 
body of opinion, particularly within the 
Republican Party, sees China as a rising 
threat to America’s economic well being 
and geo-political influence with an 
inevitable confrontation set for the middle 
of the century.113 Kissinger warns against 
this view and states that “It is unwise to 
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substitute China for the Soviet Union in 
our thinking and to apply to it the policy 
of military containment of the Cold War. 
The Soviet Union was heir to an 
imperialist tradition, which, between Peter 
the Great and the end of World War II, 
projected Russia from the region around 
Moscow to the center of Europe. The 
Chinese state in its present dimensions has 
existed substantially for 2,000 years…the 
challenge China poses for the medium-
term future will, in all likelihood, be 
political and economic, not military.”114 In 
2007 America and China agreed to open a 
defence hotline, deepen dialogue on 
nuclear issues, and increase military 
exchanges despite concerns in Washington 
about China’s conventional military 
modernisation.115  
 
A major report by a Council on Foreign 
Relations independent task force in 2007 
on US-China relations led by former US 
Trade Representative Carla Hills and 
Dennis Blair, former head of the Institute 
for Defense Analyses, concluded that 
“China’s overall trajectory over the past 
thirty-five years of engagement with the 
United States is positive. Growing 
adherence to international rules, 
institutions, and norms – particularly in 
the areas of trade and security – marks 
China’s global integration”.116 The report 
also notes Chinese concerns about 
strategic encirclement that mirror those in 
Russia: “officials interpret U.S. military 
deployments to Central Asia and outreach 
to Mongolia and Vietnam as part of an 
effort to encircle China. Beijing remains 
deeply concerned about the implications 
of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and military 
planners also fear that the United States in 
a crisis might seek to cut off China’s 
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access to strategic commodities.” 117 It 
recommends sustained and systematic 
official dialogue on military affairs to 
enhance trust and reduce the potential for 
miscommunication.118 
 
China’s overwhelming military focus is on 
ensuring Chinese sovereignty, national 
unity and national development and 
preparing for contingencies involving 
Taiwan, including the possibility of 
American intervention.119 Western 
intelligence estimates have long predicted 
a major expansion of Chinese strategic 
nuclear forces that has failed to materialise 
and Beijing has kept its nuclear forces at a 
deliberately low level. China’s total 
deployed nuclear force is estimated at 130 
warheads with perhaps a further 70 in 
storage. China’s arsenal is therefore 
comparable to Britain’s, and in fact in 
2004 the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
declared that it had the smallest arsenal of 
all the nuclear weapon states.120  
 
China currently deploys approximately 80 
land-based nuclear ballistic missiles, all of 
which carry single warheads. Only 20 of 
these, the DF-5 (CSS-4), are of inter-
continental range of 13,000km and were 
first deployed in 1981. China has been 
upgrading these missiles since the late 
1980s but its modernisation programme 
has proceeded at a very slow pace. It has 
also had the technical capability to deploy 
multiple warheads on its missiles but has 
chosen not to do so. A new missile 
currently in development is the DF-31 to 
replace the aging DF-4 missiles first 
deployed in 1980. The DF-31 is estimated 
to have a range of around 7,200km but a 
longer-range version, the DF-31A, may 
also be deployed in the next few years 
with a range of 11,000km. Some suggest 
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that the DF-31A or modernised DF-5 may 
be modified to carry multiple warheads.121  
 
China has struggled to deploy submarine-
launched ballistic missiles. It currently 
deploys only one ballistic missile 
submarines a single Xia-class submarine 
configured to carry 12 single-warhead 
Julang (JL)-1 SLBMs of 1,700km range 
that was first deployed in 1981, has rarely 
gone on deterrent patrol or ventured far 
from Chinese waters and whose 
operational status is questionable. China is 
currently developing a new Jin-class 
SSBN that will carry between 10 and 12 
of the new JL-2 SLBMs that are thought 
to have a range of 7,200-8,000km. 
American intelligence predicts that the 
first submarine may be deployed by 2010 
after significant delays.122 Experts suggest 
that by 2015 China’s nuclear stockpile 
may number 220 warheads after it deploys 
the new generation of ballistic missiles 
and perhaps three Jin-class SSBNs.  
 
Chinese nuclear doctrine is based on 
‘minimum deterrence’ and a declaratory 
policy of ‘no-first use’ of nuclear weapons 
in a conflict. China states it nuclear 
weapons are for self-defence and its 
arsenal is based on the principle of limited 
development of nuclear weapons.123 None 
of China’s long-range nuclear forces are 
believed to be on alert, the warheads for 
its 20 ICBMs are stored at a separate 
location near the missiles and the few long 
range ballistic missiles it possesses are 
generally thought to target the United 
States and Russia rather than Europe.124 
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3. Deterring ‘Rogue’ States 
The Government’s second area of 
deterrence focuses on deterring the use of 
nuclear weapons or other WMD by so-
called ‘rogue’ states. The branding of a 
particular groups of states as ‘rogues’ 
occurred soon after the Cold War when 
America began to examine how to 
configure its armed forces to deal with the 
proliferation of nuclear, biological and 
chemical weapons and advanced 
conventional weaponry to the Third 
World, particularly to despotic regimes. It 
was argued that this new breed of ‘rogue’ 
states would attempt to use WMD to deter 
America from taking action against them 
on issues affecting vital American 
interests.125 The new crop of ‘rogue’ states 
was soon labelled the primary strategic 
threat to national security after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, a view that 
was reinforced by Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait in August 1990 and continued 
throughout the 1990s.126 The attacks of 
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9/11 expanded America’s focus on 
‘rogues’ and WMD to include terrorist 
networks that must be confronted: “We 
must be prepared to stop rogue states and 
their terrorist clients before they are able 
to threaten or use weapons of mass 
destruction against the United States and 
our allies and friends”, President George 
W. Bush argued, “…The overlap between 
states that sponsor terror and those that 
pursue WMD compels us to action”.127  
 
Three states in particular have fit ‘rogue’ 
criteria: Iran, Iraq and North Korea. 
America’s 2002 National Security 
Strategy defined these ‘rogues’ as states 
that: “Brutalize their own people and 
squander their national resources for the 
personal gain of the rulers; display no 
regard for international law, threaten their 
neighbors, and callously violate 
international treaties to which they are 
party; are determined to acquire weapons 
of mass destruction, along with other 
advanced military technology, to be used 
as threats or offensively to achieve the 
aggressive designs of these regimes; 
sponsor terrorism around the globe; and 
reject basic human values and hate the 
United States and everything for which it 
stands.”128 
 
British foreign and defence policy has 
followed America’s post-Cold War focus 
on ‘rogue’ states and WMD as a general 
umbrella for nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons that does not readily 
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distinguish between them.129 The 1998 
Strategic Defence Review highlighted 
“very dangerous regimes” around the 
world and “an increasing danger from the 
proliferation of nuclear, biological and 
chemical technologies. As Iraq has amply 
demonstrated, such regimes threaten not 
only their neighbours but vital economic 
interests and even international 
stability”.130 The 9/11 attacks similarly 
shifted attention to the potential nexus of 
‘rogue’ states, WMD and international 
terrorism. The 2003 Defence White Paper 
on Delivering Security in a Changing 
World remarked that “While many of the 
conclusions reached in the SDR remain 
valid, the threats posed by international 
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction are starker, as are the 
risks to wider security posed by failed or 
failing states.”131 By 2003 Britain accepted 
the view that “International terrorism and 
the proliferation of WMD represent the 
most direct threats to our peace and 
security.”132 The response was to prepare 
to “coerce, disrupt or destroy international 
terrorists or the regimes that harbour them 
and to counter terrorists’ efforts to acquire 
chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear weapons”. This required 
expeditionary forces to intervene against 
terrorists groups and ‘rogue’ states that 
could operate alongside with American 
forces and be rapidly and frequently 
deployed beyond core regions of Europe, 
the Middle East and the Mediterranean.133 
The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was part of 
this ‘rogue state’ doctrine. 
 
It is highly likely that the UK will 
continue to engage in regional crises with 
conventional military forces in the name 
of international peace and stability. This 
might bring it into conflict with WMD-
armed adversaries. For this reason, the 
Government argues, Britain needs to keep 
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its nuclear weapons to deter a ‘rogue’ state 
from using its WMD against Britain or its 
‘vital interests’ and to resist ‘nuclear 
blackmail’ or coercion by a ‘rogue’ state 
trying to “deter us and the international 
community from taking the action 
required to maintain regional and global 
security”.134 In fact Blair argued that “the 
notion of unstable, usually deeply 
repressive and anti-democratic states, in 
some cases profoundly inimical to our 
way of life, having a nuclear capability, is 
a distinct and novel reason” for Britain to 
keep its nuclear weapons.135 
 
But there are major problems with this 
rationale: 1) the credibility of British 
deterrent threats to use nuclear weapons 
against a regional ‘rogue’ is highly 
questionable; 2) the risk of escalation to 
the use of nuclear weapons is real; 3) the 
effect of using just a handful of British 
nuclear weapons would be devastating and 
deeply counter-productive; 4) ‘nuclear 
blackmail’ or coercion has rarely worked 
in practice. 
 
The Credibility of Regional 
British Nuclear Deterrent Threats 
Future scenarios involving the use or 
threat of use of WMD by ‘rogue’ states 
invariably involve threats to use them in 
response to Western military intervention 
rather than a surprise ‘bolt from the blue’ 
WMD attack. Important lessons have been 
learnt from American/allied coalition 
actions in the 1991 Gulf War, 1999 
Kosovo conflict, 2002 invasion of 
Afghanistan and 2003 invasion of Iraq, the 
most profound of which is not to 
aggravate the United States and its allies 
in a key geopolitical region unless you 
have nuclear weapons. A report by the 
Institute for Defense Analysis for the 
Pentagon’s Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency outlines a post-1999 ‘Kosovo 
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syndrome’ whereby regional countries 
“looked with alarm at what they saw as 
the increasing willingness of the United 
States to use its military supremacy to 
impose its liberal-democratic vision and 
values on the rest of world”. This has led 
to “a new nuclear paradigm in which 
small and medium powers will try – 
perhaps with nuclear weapons – to deter 
the United States from projecting its 
overwhelming [conventional] military 
power into their internal or regional 
conflicts”.136  
 
The credibility of British nuclear deterrent 
threats is essential to their effectiveness. 
Yet there are serious questions about the 
credibility of the threat to use high-yield 
nuclear weapons against a ‘rogue’ state, 
even if the UK or Western Europe is 
attacked with WMD. These questions rest 
on the argument that the use of nuclear 
weapons in retaliation for the use of 
‘rogue’ WMD or a pre-emptive nuclear 
strike against WMD capabilities would 
likely be a disproportionate and 
indiscriminate response, deeply counter-
productive to Western political objectives 
and would be seen to be so at home and 
abroad.  
 
This is exacerbated if the regional ‘rogue’ 
uses relatively unsophisticated WMD to 
attack Western intervening forces or 
homelands that do not cause massive 
casualties and social breakdown and if the 
regime has much more to lose than 
Western interveners. The credibility of the 
threat to use British nuclear weapons in 
response to the use of unsophisticated 
biological and chemical weapons or 
perhaps a primitive nuclear device is 
undermined by the disproportionate nature 
of the response. Two important 
asymmetries come into play here: First, 
Britain and America have far more 
advanced conventional military 
capabilities than any regional ‘rogue’, they 
can increasingly operate in a CBW 
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(chemical and biological weapons) 
environment and they can inflict major 
devastation within a relatively short period 
in response to limited use of WMD, 
including a primitive nuclear weapon. The 
stakes in a conflict are also prone to be far 
greater for the ‘rogue’ regime if its 
survival is threatened than for America or 
Britain, who will almost certainly have far 
less to lose and whose national survival is 
very unlikely to be at stake.137  
 
As Ivan Oelrich from the Federation of 
American Scientists argues, the “problem 
with using the threat of nuclear retaliation 
to deter CBW attacks on the homeland is 
not that nuclear weapons are inadequate to 
the task, but that they are excessive, thus 
raising the question of proportionality, and 
hence the credibility, of their use”.138 
MOD also accepted in 2001 that 
“Deterrence policies may not prove 
effective against small scale use of CW or 
BW, especially attacks on deployed 
troops.”139 In the United States a 2001 
report for the Pentagon’s Defence Threat 
Reduction Agency (DTRA) concluded 
that ‘rogue’ state leaderships are “likely to 
regard American willingness to carry out 
implicit or vague threats of nuclear 
retaliation for WMD use as uncertain at 
best or incredible at worst” and that the 
questionable credibility of the 
commitment to using nuclear weapons 
undermines the effectiveness of deterrence 
strategies.140 The consideration of a 
nuclear response to CBW use by Saddam 
Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War, for 
example, was ruled out from the very 
beginning according to then-Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin 
Powell and National Security Advisor 
General Brent Scowcroft, despite veiled 
threats delivered by Secretary of State 
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James Baker to use them in response to 
Iraqi use of WMD.141 
 
The Risk of Nuclear Escalation 
If Britain remains committed to a doctrine 
of military intervention abroad alongside 
the United States then the key post-Cold 
War strategic deterrence challenge, as 
Keith Payne argues, will be “the 
demanding mission of ‘deterring the 
deterrent’ of a desperate challenger – that 
is, preventing a regional leader of a regime 
that is losing a conventional war to an 
American-led coalition from using WMD 
in a desperate bid to save what seems to 
be a lost cause”, particularly if the survival 
of the regime is at stake.142 The 
Government insists that British nuclear 
weapons can perform this deterrent 
function. 
 
But if a ‘rogue’ state possesses more 
advanced WMD including nuclear 
weapons that can reach Britain, Western 
Europe or the United States then the 
wisdom of pursing a strategy of regional 
intervention using conventional forces 
with or without insertion of grounds 
troops would be open to serious question. 
In particular it would be dangerous to 
assume that British nuclear deterrent 
threats could keep a conflict at the level of 
conventional weaponry with a ‘rogue’ 
state in possession of more capable WMD 
and the means to deliver them. If the 
survival of the ‘rogue’ regime is 
threatened then the asymmetry of the 
stakes involved becomes deeply 
destabilising in a nuclear environment. 
Given such asymmetrical stakes it is 
unlikely (and certainly cannot be in any 
way assured) that nuclear deterrent threats 
would prevent the use of WMD by a 
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regime facing imminent termination by 
Western conventional forces. In her study 
of the ‘strategic personality’ of Iraq and 
Iran Caroline Ziemke argues that in the 
heat of a crisis Tehran might perceive a 
threat to the survival of the Islamic 
Republic as “provoking what it believes is 
a last-resort, ‘defensive’ nuclear 
response”.143 Professor Paul Rogers also 
recounts the Global 95 Wargame at the 
US Naval War College in July 1995 in 
which Iraq uses chemical and biological 
weapons and America responds with a 
devastating nuclear strike on Baghdad.144 
 
This can easily be exacerbated by the 
difficulties of understanding the behaviour 
of ‘rogue’ regimes and problems of 
mutual incomprehension of motives, 
values and perceptions of ‘rational’ 
behaviour that were a factor in the Cold 
War’s near misses.145 Successful nuclear 
deterrence requires an understanding of 
the adversary. Yet, as Stocker argues, in 
today’s complex nuclear world “profound 
differences exist in countries’ leaderships, 
decision-making structures and process, 
tolerance of risk and costs, perceptions, 
values and interests…it is quite possible to 
behave rationally within one’s own 
parameters, yet act in ways that to others 
re incomprehensible or, importantly, 
unpredictable”.146 He goes on to argue that 
“we simply cannot assume that others will 
behave in exactly the way we would, were 
we in their position. In particular, Western 
secular and pragmatic norms are not 
universal”.147  
 
British government officials have long 
acknowledged this difficulty: in 1993 
Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind stated 
that “[I]n the absence of an established 
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deterrent relationship…[w]ould the threat 
be understood in the deterrent way in 
which it was intended; and might it have 
some unpredictable and perhaps counter-
productive consequences? Categoric 
answers to these questions might be hard 
to come by, and in their absence the utility 
of the deterrent threat as a basis for policy 
and action would necessarily be in 
doubt…it is difficult to see deterrence 
operating securely against proliferators 
[‘rogue’ states]”.148 Defence Secretary 
Geoff Hoon commented in 2002 that 
“Now we also have additional actors to 
consider, people who may be far removed 
in attitudes, values and preconceptions 
from the cautious and conservative 
members of the old Soviet Politburo. We 
can no longer be so confident what will, 
and what will not, influence their 
calculations and behaviour”.149 
 
Limited military objectives may be 
achievable, such as ousting Iraqi forces 
from Kuwait. At the extreme lies a 
situation such as the conventional military 
conflict between India and Pakistan in 
2000 over the Kargil region of disputed 
Kashmir that many observers judge to 
have teetered dangerously on the edge of 
nuclear escalation.150 Major pre-emptive 
or retaliatory military intervention would, 
however, generally be judged too 
dangerous regardless of whether Britain 
had nuclear weapons or not. As MOD’s 
Development, Concepts and Doctrine 
Centre warns: “An increase in the number 
of nuclear-armed states will affect the 
ability of the world’s leading military 
powers to undertake intervention 
operations. Operations that threaten the 
personal or regime security of autocratic 
leaderships in nuclear-armed states will 
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entail particular risk.”151 In fact Western 
possession of nuclear weapons cannot 
provide any guarantee of a safe umbrella 
for major conventional military actions 
that avoids escalation to the use of 
WMD.152 The Government’s insistence 
that possession of nuclear weapons will 
“ensure no aggressor can escalate a crisis 
beyond UK control” must be treated with 
scepticism.153 
 
The manner in which the United States 
has dealt with North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons programme and belligerent 
rhetoric is a case in point. The 
consequences of a conventional conflict 
beginning with airstrikes that could 
rapidly escalate to the use of a handful of 
primitive North Korean nuclear devices 
would be devastating. When North Korea 
ejected UN weapons inspectors who were 
inspecting its suspected nuclear weapons 
plant at Yongbyon in 1993 the United 
States threatened airstrikes. It was 
estimated at the time that American and 
South Korean military forces might suffer 
300,000-500,000 casualties within the first 
90 days of fighting, in addition to 
hundreds of thousands of civilian 
casualties; that North Korea could fire 
between 500 and 600 Scud missiles at 
targets throughout South Korea and hit 
Japan with up to 100 longer-range missiles 
armed with conventional or chemical 
warheads, and perhaps a few with nuclear 
warheads; and that a war would cost 
America more than $100 billion (in 1994) 
and the destruction and interruption of 
business would cost a trillion dollars to the 
countries involved and their immediate 
neighbours.154 Over a decade later after a 
series of agreements and confrontations 
the United States and North Korea appear 
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to be on a path towards resolution of their 
differences through the Six-Party Talks 
process initiated in 2003 involving China, 
South Korea, North Korea, Japan, Russia 
and America. In the meantime America 
has lived with North Korea having a 
handful of nuclear weapons, some of 
which may have been mated with long-
range ballistic missiles for over a decade. 
 
During the Cold War McGeorge Bundy, 
national security advisor to Presidents 
Kennedy and Johnson, stated in a Foreign 
Affairs article in 1969 that “in the real 
world of real political leaders…a decision 
that would bring even one hydrogen bob 
on one city of one’s own country would be 
recognized in advance as a catastrophic 
blunder; ten bombs on ten cities would be 
a disaster beyond history; and a hundred 
bombs on a hundred cities are 
unthinkable”.155 The same logic holds 
today in the context of ‘rogue’ states and 
the detonation of a single ‘rogue’ nuclear 
bomb in British or allied city must be 
recognised in advance as a terrible 
political calamity.  
 
Using Nuclear Weapons in a 
Regional Conflict 
The legitimacy of actually using nuclear 
weapons in a conflict is also undermined 
by their disproportionately devastating 
effect. Western governments and armed 
forces regularly stress their desire to avoid 
civilian casualties through a combination 
of precision guided weaponry and detailed 
battlefield intelligence. It is recognised 
that indiscriminate killing of civilians in 
warfare can be counter-productive to war 
aims and political support in Western 
capitals and can undermine the case for 
military intervention that is routinely 
framed as defending civilised international 
values and global peace and security. As 
Prime Minster Tony Blair declared to 
British forces involved in the bombing of 
Yugoslavia in 1999: “I believe you are 
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fighting a just war and a just cause… I 
believe we are fighting for the values of 
civilisation here”. 156  
 
The ability and intent to discriminate 
between combatants and non-combatants 
is an important plank of the Western ‘Just 
War’ tradition that is often invoked to 
justify intervention.157 There is 
considerable unwillingness on the part of 
Western governments to contemplate 
inflicting massive and indiscriminate loss 
of life upon a ‘rogue’ nation’s population 
for the actions of its leadership in the 
name of defending the ‘liberal peace’ and 
international order given that the national 
survival of the Western intervening 
powers is unlikely to be under threat.  
 
In 1998 former head of Strategic 
Command General Lee Butler asked 
“could we really hold an entire society to 
account for the decisions of a single leader 
or ‘rogue’ regime?”158 In 2001 Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave the 
Bush administration’s answer. He 
presented a hypothetical situation in which 
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, as he 
did in 1991, but then launched a ballistic 
missile with a weapon of mass destruction 
to demonstrate to the world that he had 
such capabilities: “Think of the argument 
in the White House. Let’s say that Saddam 
Hussein had done what I described, and he 
then invaded Kuwait. And someone would 
go to the president of some country with a 
nuclear capability and say, “Gee, Mr. 
President, you should use your nuclear 
weapons against Saddam Hussein.” What 
would you be doing, in effect? You’d be 
using a nuclear weapon against a country 
where the people are repressed, where the 
people are treated brutally, where the 
people are, in large measure, hostages to a 
powerful dictator that has been repressing 
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them for decades. That is not a happy 
prospect.”159  
 
Given these concerns any consideration of 
the use of nuclear weapons in a regional 
conflict now depends not on how much 
damage they can do but how little.160 Yet 
the use of even relatively low-yield or 
limited use of British nuclear weapons in a 
regional conflict with a ‘rogue’ state 
would be devastating, indiscriminate and 
counter-productive. The use of even one 
or two ‘sub-strategic’ 10kt warheads 
would in all probability kill and severely 
injure tens of thousands of people. Use of 
one or two 100kt standard Trident 
warheads can be expected to kill hundreds 
of thousands. The two bombs dropped on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 14kt and 
20kt respectively and between them killed 
around 200,000 people. Douglas 
Holdstock and Liz Waterston state that the 
‘lethal area’ for a 100kt warhead, defined 
as the area within which the number of 
survivors is equal to the number of blast 
fatalities, if circular has a radius of 2.4km. 
“The heat flash from a 100kt airburst 
would cause lethal burns out of doors over 
about 75km2. Flash blindness would occur 
over many kilometres”. Radiation doses 
would affect many more people over a 
much wider area. They go on to state that 
“a single nuclear explosion over a 
medium-sized city would overwhelm the 
health services of even a developed 
country, and an attack with multiple 
weapons would disrupt the whole 
country’s economic and social structure”. 
This would interrupt the availability of 
food and potable water, provision of basic 
health and social services and lead to 
many more deaths through the indirect 
effects of a nuclear attack.161 A report by 
                                                     
159 Donald Rumsfeld, CNN Interview with Secretary 
Rumsfeld, June 1, 2001, United States Department 
of Defense, Washington, D.C. Retrieved March 3, 
2007 from 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t0604
2001_t0601cnn.html>. 
160 Jeremy Stocker, The United Kingdom and 
Nuclear Deterrence, Adelphi Paper 386, Routledge 
for IISS, London, 2007, p.51. 
161 Douglas Holdstock and Liz Waterston, “Nuclear 
Weapons, a Continuing Threat to Health”, The 
Lancet, 355(9214), April 29, 2000, pp. 1544-1547. 
Scottish CND states that a single 100kt 
Trident nuclear warhead would kill 98 per 
cent of people within 1.6km of ground 
zero and injure 2 per cent, kill 55 percent 
within 1.6-2.9km and injure 40 per cent, 
and kill 8 per cent within 2.9-5.3km and 
injure 45 per cent. It estimates that if a 
single Trident warhead was detonated 
over Moscow, for example, it would cause 
around 200,000 fatalities.162 
 
Quite apart from the destruction wrought 
by the initial blast, heat flash and 
radiation, the incendiary effects of a single 
100kt nuclear blast would also be 
devastating. In Hiroshima, a tremendous 
fire storm developed within 20 minutes 
after detonation. A fire storm burns in 
upon itself ferociously with gale force 
winds blowing in towards the centre of the 
fire.163 For large warheads (those above 
100kt), the thermal effects of the 
explosion extend much further than the 
blast effects. William Bell and Cham 
Dallas observe that “casualties resulting 
from fires, and burns in a nuclear attack 
would be of major impact for civil defense 
and emergency health care… The entire 
US has specialized facilities to treat 
roughly 1,500 burn victims, which is far 
less than the burn casualties produced by 
one single small nuclear explosion…most 
of these beds are already occupied.”164 
 
New research also suggests that the use of 
100 Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons in a 
regional conflict would devastate the 
earth’s ozone layer. It finds “losses in 
excess of 20% globally, 25–45% at mid-
latitudes, and 50–70% at northern high 
latitudes persisting for 5 years, with 
substantial losses continuing for 5 
additional years” from the heating of the 
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stratosphere by smoke plumes released by 
nuclear-induced firestorms. This presents 
an “unprecedented hazard to the biosphere 
worldwide”.165 
 
If Britain did choose to cross the nuclear 
threshold alone or with America it would 
not do so for the use of just one or two 
nuclear weapons for limited military 
objectives given the power that can now 
be unleashed with conventional forces. 
War plans involving the use of nuclear 
weapons in regional conflicts generally 
involve the use of tens, if not hundreds, of 
weapons to destroy a country’s WMD, 
military and governing infrastructure.166 
Two examples highlight planning for 
multiple use of nuclear weapons for 
limited military objectives: In the build up 
to the 1991 Gulf War Secretary of 
Defense Dick Cheney reportedly asked 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
General Colin Powell to “explore 
hypothetical nuclear-strike options against 
Iraqi units. Powell responded, ‘We’re not 
going to let that genie loose.’ Cheney 
agreed, but he was curious to know what 
would be required. ‘The results unnerved 
me,’ recalls Powell. ‘To do serious 
damage to just one armored division 
dispersed in the desert would require a 
considerable number of small tactical 
nuclear weapons. I showed this analysis to 
Cheney and then had it destroyed.’167 
Richard Rhodes reports that in 1961 
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara 
visited U.S. Strategic Air Command for a 
briefing about nuclear war planning. He 
asked if the current nuclear targeting 
system had been applied to a target known 
to have been destroyed by a nuclear 
weapon, Hiroshima. The answer was yes 
and that the current nuclear targeting 
system would designate three nuclear 
warheads of 80kt each despite the fact that 
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a single unsophisticated 14kt nuclear 
bomb devastated the city in August 
1945.168 
 
Use of nuclear weapons by Western 
powers for anything other than national 
survival would almost certainly terminate 
the international norm against the use of 
nuclear weapons that has held since 
1945.169 The use of a nuclear weapon by a 
‘rogue’ state could, on the other hand, be 
used by Western governments to reinforce 
that norm.170 John Simpson, for example, 
questions whether the “theoretical ability 
of nuclear explosives to destroy other 
WMD justifies their use in this role, 
despite the destructive effect this will 
almost certainly have on the international 
nuclear non-proliferation regime”.171 
There would considerable danger that 
nuclear use could become routine against 
‘rogue’ states, that possession and use of 
nuclear weapons will be legitimised 
leading to further nuclear proliferation, 
that nuclear weapons would be used in 
conflicts by non-Western states and that 
crossing the nuclear threshold and 
breaching the nuclear ‘taboo’ would place 
Britain in a far less stable and predictable 
world.172 Britain’s international standing 
would deteriorate and its ability to take a 
leading role in preventing the further 
proliferation of nuclear weapons would 
disappear. To cite Lee Butler again: “how 
could the US or UK possible justify use of 
nuclear weapons in response to chemical 
or biological attack and legitimise the very 
means we abhor and condemn? How 
could they ever again justify their WMD 
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non-proliferation efforts and claims to 
international leadership?”173  
 
Nuclear use in the Middle East, North East 
Asia or other regional conflict zones 
would be an unprecedented disaster with 
massive humanitarian, political, 
environmental and economic costs and 
deeply counter-productive to Western 
political values and objectives. This must 
be accepted at the highest levels of 
government. Even if a nuclear or other 
WMD attack by a ‘rogue’ state has 
occurred a devastating British nuclear 
retaliatory strike would not undo the 
damage done but would in likelihood 
make things considerably worse.174 
 
Facing nuclear coercion 
Does this then leave Western nations open 
to nuclear coercion or blackmail by a 
nuclear or WMD-armed ‘rogue’ state? 
The British government argues that its 
“continued possession of a nuclear 
deterrent provides an assurance that we 
cannot be subjected in future to nuclear 
blackmail”.175 What if Saddam Hussein 
invaded Kuwait and threatened a nuclear 
attack against America and Britain if 
either intervened with conventional 
forces? Surely we need to keep our 
nuclear forces to defend against such a 
situation in the future? Unfortunately for 
those in favour of keeping British nuclear 
weapons for just such an eventuality the 
reality is that they would offer little 
assurance or guarantee of protection. 
 
First, it is important to note that 
possession of nuclear weapons has not 
prevented regional aggression against the 
interests of nuclear weapon states. The 
Soviet Union established control over 
Eastern Europe during the period of 
American nuclear monopoly, North Korea 
invaded US-backed South Korea in 1950, 
North Vietnam fought a nuclear-armed 
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China and America, Argentina invaded the 
Falklands/Malvinas in 1982 and Iraq 
invaded of Kuwait in 1990 and launched 
Scud missile attacks against nuclear-
armed Israel. As Stocker argues, “to date, 
Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons 
has not been relevant to a series of 
regional crises and interventions – Suez, 
confrontation with Indonesia, the 
Falklands, and the Gulf Wars”.176 The late 
Robin Cook MP also suggests that “it is 
not easy to see what practical return 
Britain ever got out of the extravagant 
sums we invested in our nuclear systems. 
None of our wars was ever won by them 
and none of the enemies we fought was 
deterred by them. General Galtieri was not 
deterred from seizing the Falklands, 
although Britain possessed the nuclear 
bomb and Argentina did not.”177 
 
In the context of WMD-armed regional 
‘rogue’ states it is America’s and the 
wider West’s conventional military forces 
that provide the most significant military 
deterrent, not its nuclear weapons. A 
major report for the Pentagon’s DTRA 
argues that missile defence systems and 
non-nuclear strategic weapons based on 
powerful, advanced precision munitions 
comprise a far more credible retaliatory 
threat than implicit or explicit nuclear 
threats. This is based in part on “an 
appreciation that the US would not feel 
constrained about their employment” 
having demonstrated its willingness to use 
advanced conventional weaponry against 
regional adversaries several times since 
the end of the Cold War.178 If a nuclear-
armed ‘rogue’ state is intent on an 
aggressive course of action regardless of 
the threat of major conventional military 
reprisals either in a pre-emptive attack 
before the planned aggression or in a 
punishing retaliatory strike, then it is 
unlikely to be deterred by nuclear 
deterrent threats.  The United States began 
investing in conventional strategic 
weapons for a new ‘global strike’ mission 
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assigned to US Strategic Command in 
2003.179  It has focussed on converting 
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles such 
Trident missiles to conventional missions 
and work on next-generation conventional 
strategic systems, such as the Army’s 
Advanced Hypersonic Weapon.180 
 
Second, nuclear coercion has rarely 
worked in practice and is generally done 
by the strong to the weak. Michael 
MccGwire argues that “despite theorists’ 
best efforts, there is still no example of 
nuclear compellance. This inherent 
constraint applies to the rogue state that 
acquires a minimal capability” and that it 
is very difficult to translate the any form 
of coercive power that might be derived 
from nuclear weapons into practical 
gains.181 Ghosh, too, argues that nuclear 
armed states have often resorted 
unsuccessfully to nuclear coercion in 
pursuit of their national interests, but that 
the consequences have proved “dangerous 
and ambiguous at best”.182 Jacek Kugler’s 
study in the mid-1980s of major crises 
involving nuclear powers concluded 
nuclear weapons did not “directly affect 
the outcomes of extreme crises or deter 
conflicts” with nuclear or non-nuclear 
nations or provide an obvious 
advantage.183 Instances where nuclear 
compellance has been claimed to work, 
notably Eisenhower’s threat to China if it 
did not agree to terminate the Korean War 
in 1953 and George H. W. Bush’s veiled 
threat of nuclear retaliation in response to 
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the use of chemical weapons by Saddam 
Hussein in 1991, have been widely 
questioned.184  
 
Third, major Western powers, including 
Britain, will continue to have significant 
conventional military, economic and 
political power to resist nuclear coercion 
by a ‘rogue’ state regardless of whether 
Western powers possess nuclear weapons. 
If a ‘rogue’ state attempts to deter Western 
intervention to restore the status quo ante 
and has sophisticated WMD then a long-
term strategy of political, military and 
economic containment and isolation from 
a position of considerable conventional 
military, diplomatic and economic 
strength will tend to provide an 
appropriate solution in the majority of 
cases, such as the isolation of Iraq from 
1991-2003 and North Korea since the 
early 1990s. The experience of the 2003 
invasion of Iraq should demonstrate the 
dire consequences of full-scale regional 
intervention regardless of the use of 
WMD. It has so far cost America alone an 
estimated $3 trillion, the lives of 4,300 
coalition troops and at least 90,000 
civilian deaths according to Iraq Body 
Count.185 In 2006 a team of American and 
Iraqi epidemiologists estimated that 
655,000 more people have died in Iraq 
since coalition forces arrived in March 
2003 than would have died if the invasion 
had not occurred.186 
                                                     
184 Rosemary Foot, ‘Nuclear Coercion and the 
Ending of the Korean conflict’, International 
Security, 13(3), Winter 1988-1989; McGeorge 
Bundy, “Nuclear weapons and the Gulf”, Foreign 
Affairs, 70(4), Fall 1991. 
185 Aida Edemariam, “The True Cost of War”¸ The 
Guardian, February 28, 2008; Iraq Coalition 
Casualty Count, http://icasualties.org, accessed 
March 10, 2008; Iraq Body Count, 
http://www.iraqbodycount.org, accessed March 10, 
2008. 
186 David Brown, “Study Claims Iraq’s ‘Excess’ 
Death Toll Has Reached 655,000”, The Washington 
Post, October 11, 2006, p. A12. 
Nick Ritchie 
 
 33 
 
 
4. Deterring Nuclear Terrorism 
The Government’s third deterrence area 
for British nuclear weapons is deterrence 
of state-sponsored acts of nuclear 
terrorism. Acts of nuclear terrorism can 
vary from use of a primitive nuclear 
explosive device to attacks on civilian 
nuclear power facilities such as power 
reactors or high-level radioactive waste 
storage tanks. 187 The ‘state-sponsored’ 
codicil is important. In October 2005 
Prime Minster Tony Blair declared “I do 
not think that anyone pretends that the 
independent nuclear deterrent is a defence 
against terrorism” and the Government 
acknowledges that “our nuclear deterrent 
is not designed to deter non-state actors” 
acting alone.188 An influential article in the 
Wall Street Journal in January 2007 by 
former US Secretary of state Henry 
Kissinger, former Secretary of State 
George Schultz, former Secretary of 
Defense William Perry and former 
Senator Sam Nunn stated authoritatively 
that “non-state terrorist groups with 
nuclear weapons are conceptually outside 
the bounds of a deterrent strategy”. 189   
 
Nevertheless, the prospect of deterring 
even state-sponsored terrorist groups, or 
‘non-state actors’, that receive substantial 
support from a host country is 
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questionable. Terrorist groups, state-
sponsored or not, are extremely difficult to 
deter because they are inherently 
revisionist and may regard even failed 
attacks as superior to inaction.190  
Conventional deterrence may have a role 
to play in retaliating against a state 
thought to be sponsoring or harbouring a 
terrorist group that conducted a WMD 
attack, but plausible deniability, the limits 
of nuclear forensics, the difficulty of 
determining and demonstrably 
establishing linkages between non-state 
actors and state sponsors make the 
prospect of an immediate retaliatory 
nuclear strike incredible.191 In March 2008 
the head of the Pentagon’s DTRA called 
on the US government to strengthen its 
capabilities to track the source of nuclear 
material that could be used in an act of 
terrorism. Analysis of radiation and 
isotopic signatures to provide details about 
the material used in the weapon, including 
its country of origin would currently take 
months.192 Could Britain be certain that a 
‘rogue’ leadership knew exactly what its 
nuclear experts working in its clandestine 
nuclear weapons programme were up to 
with regard to terrorist groups and the 
extent of the links between a terrorist 
group and different factions within a 
‘rogue’ state leadership? The nebulous 
nature of al-Qaeda and the A. Q. Khan 
nuclear smuggling network and questions 
over exactly how much Saddam Hussein 
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knew about the state of Iraq’s WMD 
programmes prior to the invasion in 2003 
raise serious questions about the degree to 
which a ‘rogue’ leadership could be 
directly and immediately implicated in a 
terrorist nuclear attack.193  
 
Only where there was incontrovertible 
evidence of state sponsorship of nuclear 
terrorism could a major military response 
be immediately considered, and a nuclear 
response would undoubtedly be difficult, 
indiscriminate and counter-productive for 
three reasons. First, as Ivan Oelrich 
argues, finding targets of value to terrorist 
groups threaten with destruction is 
difficult “and the targets almost certainly 
would not be best attacked with nuclear 
weapons”.194 The difficult of targeting a 
devastating retaliatory attack undermines 
threats of deterrence by punishment.195 
Even if a handful of targets could be 
located for which nuclear weapons might 
conceivably be used, such as a terrorist 
camp in a remote mountain area or cave 
structure, the use of nuclear weapons for 
such a limited military objective would 
dramatically lower the threshold for the 
use of nuclear weapons and undermine the 
current norm against their use.  As former 
Conservative defence minister Michael 
Portillo asked in 2005, “In reality our most 
likely nuclear opponent is not a country 
but an urban guerrilla detonating a dirty 
bomb in a suitcase in one of our cities. 
Trident would be ready to retaliate…But 
at whom, exactly?”.196 
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Second, a retaliatory nuclear response 
would likely kill thousands of innocent 
civilians. Once again, the prospect of 
killing thousands of innocent people for 
the actions of terrorist group that may 
have received direct or indirect assistance 
from a ‘rogue’ regime would be massively 
disproportionate and probably illegal. 
Turning once more to former Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, he 
hypothesised in 2002 that “Let’s say that 
the al Qaeda had used a biological weapon 
and…within a relatively short period of 
weeks you were up to a million people 
dead. Let’s say the al Qaeda had done that 
and the al Qaeda are in Afghanistan, and 
the Afghanistan people didn’t do that. Can 
you imagine going in and saying to the 
President, I think it would be a terrific 
idea if we used a nuclear response to the 
fact in Afghanistan because the al Qaeda 
used a biological weapon or a chemical 
weapon against the United States. And 
you’d end up punishing people who in 
many respects were victims, they were 
hostages of the al Qaeda…the punishment 
would be against people who were really 
not the cause of the biological attack.”197  
 
Third, as Malcolm Chalmers argues, 
terrorist groups “would be delighted to 
provoke a Trident retaliation, fully aware 
of the global opprobrium that this would 
bring on Britain”. A nuclear response 
could therefore play into terrorists’ hands 
and lead to further terrorist attacks against 
Britain.198 In reality nuclear deterrent 
threats to destroy terrorist targets or those 
in the sponsoring state lack credibility, 
utility and military or political value.   
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4. Nuclear Weapons for General 
Uncertainty 
The Government’s final area of deterrence 
for British nuclear weapons is to provide a 
general, global, deterrent threat to defend 
a range of ‘vital interests’ in an uncertain 
future characterised by two trends: the 
spread of nuclear weapons and an increase 
in complex, regional conflicts that could 
threaten Britain’s ‘vital interests’. 
According to the Government these 
conflicts can be expected to revolve 
around weak and failing states, 
international terrorism, pressure on key 
resources such as oil and water, 
population growth, climate change, the 
proliferation of military technologies and 
a general increase in international 
instability.199 Britain must keep its nuclear 
weapons because nuclear proliferation is 
likely to continue and when combined 
with an increasingly complex and 
challenging global security environment 
could “lead to an increased risk of conflict 
involving a nuclear-armed state”.200 The 
inability to “accurately predict the global 
security environment over the next 20 to 
50 years” means such scenarios cannot 
rule out.201 Sir Michael Quinlan describes 
this as a general threat addressed ‘to 
whom it may concern’ over the coming 
decades.202 This, in fact, is an incentive for 
nuclear proliferation since every 
government can present this ‘just in case’ 
                                                     
199 MOD and FCO, United Kingdom’s Nuclear 
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201 MOD and FCO, United Kingdom’s Nuclear 
Deterrent, p. 6. 
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strategic rationale for acquiring or 
retaining nuclear weapons. 
 
The argument rests on the assumptions 
that: 1) general nuclear proliferation will 
pose a threat to Britain; and 2) British 
nuclear weapons are an essential and 
credible tool for dealing with potential 
nuclear and other WMD threats to 
Britain’s ‘vital interests’ in a complex and 
uncertain world.203 We must therefore ask: 
how likely is a cascade of future nuclear 
proliferation; is there an automatic 
connection between further nuclear 
proliferation and a solid case for keeping 
our own; what relevance will British 
nuclear weapons have to future, complex 
conflicts that threaten its ‘vital interests’; 
and what about the constraints on their use 
from their indiscriminate and massively 
destructive nature and the network of 
international declarations, treaties and 
agreements that define the current global 
nuclear order, which is of enormous value 
to Britain? Exploring these questions 
reveals that far from offering a ‘general 
deterrent’ in a complex and uncertain 
future security environment, nuclear 
deterrent threats would be of little 
relevance and utility and the use of British 
nuclear weapons would be an 
unprecedented disaster. 
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A General Threat from Nuclear 
Proliferation? 
The Government suggests that the 
existence of nuclear weapons in the hands 
of others is a decisive factor for retaining 
British nuclear weapons regardless of who 
has them, how many, where and for what 
reasons. Taken to its logical conclusion 
this assertion stipulates that any and all 
actual or potential current and future 
nuclear weapon capabilities represent 
sufficient a threat to the UK as to warrant 
a retaliatory nuclear threat for the 
indefinite future. In doing so the 
Government conflates material nuclear 
weapon capabilities with deeply 
threatening political intentions and assigns 
these meanings to any and all such 
capabilities.204 But this approach is 
undermined by the fact that the British 
government assigns very clear ‘defensive’ 
political meanings to its own nuclear 
weapons. It argues that British nuclear 
weapons are employed solely to deter 
aggressive actions against its vital 
interests and never to coerce others and 
that they would only be used in self-
defence and “even then only in extreme 
circumstances”.205 The Government 
argues that the actual or potential threat 
posed by British nuclear weapons to 
potential adversaries should be judged 
based on these meanings rather than 
equating the mere existence of Britain’s 
nuclear weapons with an existential threat 
to all the world’s states. Based on this 
logic the Government should limit its 
general deterrent argument to the likely 
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political intentions of states that have, are 
likely to, or could potentially acquire 
nuclear weapons. 
 
Closer inspection reveals that the general 
nature of this assertion is problematic and 
that nuclear proliferation will likely not be 
unconstrained or constitute an automatic 
threat to Britain. Indeed the vast majority 
of current nuclear arsenals and potential 
nuclear weapon capabilities present no 
threat to the UK for which a British 
retaliatory strategic nuclear threat is 
relevant.  
 
The 2006 Trident White Paper bases 
possible future nuclear threats on the facts 
that “the number of states possessing 
nuclear weapons has continued to grow”, 
“ballistic missile technology has continued 
to spread” and “most of the 40 members 
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group export 
control organisation have the technical 
ability and means to initiate a viable 
nuclear weapons programme”.206 There 
are currently eight other states that possess 
nuclear weapons: America, Russia, China, 
France, India, Pakistan, Israel and North 
Korea and one state – Iran – that is 
suspected of developing a nuclear 
weapons capability. The 40 members of 
the NSG that do not possess nuclear 
weapons are Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine. Other 
states that are often cited as states that 
might choose to develop nuclear weapons 
are Syria, Libya, Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia.207  
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Of these 53 countries (8 states with 
nuclear weapons plus 1 suspected, 40 
NSG states and 4 others) 23 are members 
of NATO.208 Two more, Croatia and 
Ukraine, are aspiring members. A further 
seven are members of the European 
Union.209 Of the remaining counties 
Britain enjoys close or friendly relations 
with 16 and amicable relations with 
Belarus and Libya.210 This leaves three 
countries with which the UK does not 
enjoy close, friendly or amicable relations: 
North Korea, Iran and Syria. Of the 
countries with which Britain currently 
enjoys close, friendly or amicable 
relations, the UK could conceivably face 
hostile nuclear threats from five should 
relations break down with a change of 
government and subsequent confrontation 
over Britain’s ‘vital interests’: Russia, 
China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Libya, 
assuming the latter two develop and 
deploy nuclear weapons in the future. 
 
This leaves a total of eight countries that 
might pose a strategic nuclear threat to the 
UK over the medium- to long-term future: 
Russia, China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
Libya, North Korea, Iran and Syria. A 
British strategic nuclear arsenal may be 
relevant to the current and potential future 
capabilities of these countries according to 
the logic of nuclear deterrence, rather than 
any and all actual or potential current and 
future nuclear weapon capabilities 
anywhere in the world. Russia and China 
have been addressed above. Libya 
abandoned its WMD programmes in 2003 
after a long period of behind-the-scenes 
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dialogue with the UK and USA.211 North 
Korea also appears to be a path towards a 
‘strategic decision’ to abandon its nuclear 
capability after five years of extensive 
dialogue between China, Russia, North 
Korea, Japan, South Korea and 
America.212  
 
The Government also argues that “most of 
the major threats and risks [to global 
security] emanate from failed or fragile 
states” but it must be noted that currently 
only four of the top 50 states in the Failed 
States Index have or are known to have 
plans or are suspected of plans for 
developing a military or civilian nuclear 
capability: North Korea, Syria, Egypt and 
Pakistan.213 This much more specific 
threat assessment undermines the 
Government’s assertion that Britain’s 
security will automatically be diminished 
if it relinquishes nuclear weapons purely 
from the fact that nuclear weapons or the 
potential to develop weapon capabilities 
exist elsewhere in the world. 
 
This list of countries may change over the 
lifetime of Trident and its proposed 
successor, but the history of nuclear 
proliferation suggests that it is unlikely to 
do so dramatically. Bruno Tertrais 
concludes that “changes in the nature of 
nuclear threat…will take place slowly and 
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with few surprises” and that 
“technological changes in the nuclear field 
are fairly slow, and there have been few 
radical ruptures”.214 A 2001 report on 
Future Global Nuclear Threats 
commissioned by the Pentagon’s DTRA 
judged that “the majority of NPT nuclear 
weapon states are significantly scaling 
back their nuclear arsenals” and that “the 
number of proliferation problem countries 
has remained relatively stable – and low”. 
The expansion of nuclear programmes 
“remain a concern in a small number of 
countries, but the prospect of sudden and 
drastic nuclear build-ups appear low”. The 
report stresses problems caused by the 
proliferation of inter-continental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs) and WMD terrorism 
over nuclear proliferation.215 A more 
recent report for DTRA published in 
January 2008 reiterates this conclusion: 
“nuclear proliferation is not a wildfire – 
only a few states are wilful proliferants – 
but regional powers seeking to counter US 
military superiority may turn to weapons 
of mass destruction”.216  
 
It remains the case that the vast majority 
of states that could develop nuclear 
weapons have chosen not to and that since 
the dawn of the nuclear age many states 
have abandoned nuclear weapon 
programmes (Sweden, Canada, Australia, 
Switzerland, Japan, Argentina, Brazil, 
Taiwan, South Korea, Yugoslavia, 
Indonesia, Romania) or surrendered 
nuclear weapons (South Africa, Belarus, 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan).217 Jacques 
Hymans argues that the decision to go 
nuclear is a revolutionary “leap in the 
dark” and for the very great majority of 
states and their leaders the development 
and deployment of nuclear weapons offers 
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little temptation. He dispels the myth of a 
‘tipping point’ domino theory in which the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons by one or 
two ‘rogue’ states will necessarily lead to 
a cascade of nuclear proliferation: “the 
typical assumption that underlies the dark 
prognostications of ‘life in a nuclear-
armed crowd’ simply do not stand up 
against the empirical record. They are, in 
short, myths”.218 This could change 
through the use of nuclear weapons by 
Western states that are purportedly 
upholding the norms of nuclear non-
proliferation in the name of a liberal world 
order or the collapse of the NPT through a 
failure by its members to fulfil both its 
non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament 
commitments. 
 
Constraints on the use of British 
Nuclear Weapons 
If Government policy is to be believed 
then British nuclear weapons cannot 
provide a ‘general ‘ nuclear deterrent to 
whomever if ay concern because of a 
number of constraints in the form of 
international agreements, treaties and 
resolutions. These constitute vital parts of 
the rules-based international nuclear order 
that is of great value to Britain and 
without which international nuclear 
disorder would be the norm.219 For 
example the Government’s 2008 National 
Security Strategy of the United Kingdom 
stresses that “We believe that a 
multilateral approach – in particular a 
rules-based approach led by international 
institutions – brings not only greater 
effectiveness but also, crucially, greater 
legitimacy.220 
 
There are currently five nuclear weapon-
free zones covering Africa, Latin 
America, South-East Asia, the South 
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Pacific and Central Asia. Mongolia has 
also formally declared itself a nuclear 
weapon-free zone. Britain has ratified 
protocols to the zones in Africa, Latin 
America and the South Pacific and in 
doing so has agreed not to deploy or use 
or threaten to use nuclear weapons in 
these geographic areas. Agreement has yet 
to be reached on a protocol to the 1996 
treaty covering South-East Asia and the 
2007 treaty covering Central Asia. 
 
Britain has also issued formal assurances 
that it “will not use nuclear weapons 
against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties 
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an 
invasion or any other attack on the United 
Kingdom, its dependent territories, its 
armed forces or other troops, its allies or 
on a State towards which it has a security 
commitment, carried out or sustained by 
such a non-nuclear-weapon State in 
association or alliance with a nuclear-
weapon State”. This ‘negative security 
assurance’ was first issued in 1978 and 
repeated again at the 1995 NPT Review 
and Extension Conference. The 
Government says this assurance does not 
apply to states that are in ‘material breach’ 
of their own non-proliferation obligations 
under the NPT. 221 
 
The Government also insists that Britain 
would only ever use nuclear weapons in 
“extreme circumstances of self-
defence”.222 This phrase comes from the 
1996 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
Advisory Opinion on the “Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons”. 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter 
permits the use of force for individual or 
collective self-defence. The International 
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Court of Justice stated that the rules of 
humanitarian law applicable in armed 
conflict are fundamental and constitute 
intransgressible principles of international 
customary law. Customary international 
law states that the use of force must 
comply with the requirements of the law 
applicable in armed conflict, in particular 
the principles and rules of humanitarian 
law. The ICJ has confirmed that it well-
established and intransgressible rules of 
customary international law are that the 
use of force in self-defence must be 
proportional to the armed attack, 
necessary to respond to it, distinguishes 
between combatants and non-combatants 
(civilians) and does not cause unnecessary 
suffering.223  
 
The Court concluded that “the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons would generally 
be contrary to the rules of international 
law applicable in armed conflict, and in 
particular the principles and rules of 
humanitarian law” applicable in armed 
conflict because the destructive blast, 
incendiary and radiation effects of nuclear 
weapons cannot be contained either in 
space or time. In fact the Court judged that 
the use of nuclear weapons “seems 
scarcely reconcilable” with these 
principles and rules.224 It could not, 
however, “conclude definitively whether 
the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme 
circumstance of self-defence, in which the 
very survival of a State would be at stake” 
(emphasis added).225 
 
The British government accepted this 
ruling and does not dispute that 
international humanitarian law applies to 
nuclear weapons. The 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and their 1977 Additional 
Protocol form the core of intentional 
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humanitarian law and have been ratified 
by the UK. Use of British nuclear 
weapons would therefore only be legal if 
their use constituted a proportionate 
response to aggressive actions, was a 
necessary response to an attack, 
discriminated between combatants and 
non-combatants, did not cause 
unnecessary suffering and was consistent 
with the protocols to the nuclear weapon-
free zones that Britain has signed as well 
as the ‘negative security guarantee’ 
reaffirmed in 1995. This dramatically 
reduces the scope of ‘general’ British 
nuclear deterrent threats and, when 
combined with likely potential future 
nuclear adversaries, depicts a very narrow 
possible area of application for future 
British nuclear threats. 
 
Rethinking National Security  
and the Relevance of Nuclear 
Threats 
The Government insists that British 
nuclear deterrent threats will provide a 
crucial defence of its ‘vital interests’ in a 
complex, uncertain future international 
security environment in which the UK is 
likely to find itself facing in regional 
conflicts with nuclear-armed adversaries. 
On closer inspection it is extremely 
difficult to deduce what positive 
contribution British nuclear weapons 
could make as a ‘general deterrent’ to 
protect the country’s ‘vital interests’ and 
address complex future crises. 
 
The concept of national security has 
shifted considerably since the end of the 
Cold War, becoming both broader and 
deeper. During the Cold War it was 
conceived almost exclusively in terms of 
nation-states and military security based 
on nuclear deterrence, standing armies and 
military alliances. The post-Cold War 
period has seen a major 
reconceptualisation of the concept to 
include complex and interlinked issues of 
environmental security particularly in 
relation to the effects of climate change, 
mass poverty and economic injustice, 
global pandemic diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS, mass migration and economic 
and political refugees, international 
terrorism, asymmetric warfare including 
cyber-warfare, the spread of WMD and 
advanced conventional military 
technologies, ethnic and sectarian 
nationalism and competition over access 
to key resources such as oil and water.226 
In this context global socio-economic 
divisions and environmental constraints 
will, as Professor Paul Rogers argues, “be 
core factors in determining levels of 
international insecurity in the next three 
decades” rather than military balances of 
power.227 These issues have been 
progressively integrated into the Western 
conception of security at national, regional 
and global levels.  
 
Two key drivers of this 
reconceptualisation are the concept of 
‘human security’ and the processes of 
globalisation. The concept of human 
security argues that the geo-political, 
state-centric military concept of security 
inherited from the Cold War was 
inadequate to addressing post-Cold War 
threats. The focus of security should be at 
the individual and societal level rather 
than the security of states as determined 
by states.228 In 2003 the report of the 
Commission on Human Security, Human 
Security Now, stated that “human security 
means protecting vital freedoms. It means 
protecting people from critical (severe) 
and pervasive (widespread) threats and 
situations. It means using processes that 
build on people’s strengths and 
aspirations. It means creating political, 
social, environmental, economic, military 
and cultural systems that together give 
people the building blocks of survival, 
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livelihood and dignity.”229 It highlighted 
the importance of protecting people in 
violent conflict, protecting and 
empowering people in post-conflict 
situations, and economic insecurity, global 
health and education as the focus for 
thinking about ‘security’. These ideas at 
the heart of the human security paradigm 
have often been invoked to justify 
Western military interventions for 
humanitarian and other purposes.230 
 
Globalisation can be defined as “processes 
whereby social relations acquire relatively 
distanceless and borderless qualities, so 
that human lives are increasingly played 
out in the world as a single place”.231 
These globalising processes are 
characterised by both integration and 
fragmentation and they have transformed 
how national security is defined by 
interconnecting and trans-nationalising 
threats beyond the boundaries of nation-
states.232 The negative aspects of 
globalisation have exacerbated poverty 
and environmental degradation, facilitated 
the proliferation of military technologies, 
the global reach of terrorist organisations, 
economic crises that extend across state 
borders, threats to information 
infrastructures through remote cyber-
warfare, diseases that can spread rapidly 
throughout the world, and a marginalised 
‘majority world’ that is increasingly aware 
of its marginalised position relative to 
global elites.233 
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The Labour Government accepts this 
formulation of global security threats and 
challenges. For Tony Blair the concept of 
human security and the security 
implications of globalisation required the 
investment of considerable political 
capital in addressing global debt, African 
poverty and development and climate 
change at the highest levels of 
international politics throughout his tenure 
as Prime Minister. It also meant a British 
commitment to military intervention to 
protect the vulnerable populations of 
dictatorial regimes and to deal with new 
threats symptomatic of globalisation. Two 
speeches in particular stand out. The first, 
delivered in Chicago in 1999, outlined 
“The Doctrine of the International 
Community” and set out criteria for 
humanitarian intervention, particularly in 
the context of the Kosovo conflict. Blair 
insisted that “globalisation is not just 
economic. It is also a political and security 
phenomenon…we are all internationalists 
now whether we like it or not”.234 In the 
second, delivered aboard HMS Albion in 
2007, he argued that Britain must be a 
leader on issues such as climate change, 
global poverty, peaceful resolution of 
conflicts, but that globalisation and global 
threats mean Britain must also be prepared 
to intervene in conflicts: “The frontiers of 
our security no longer stop at the 
Channel…The new frontiers for our 
security are global.”235  This formulation 
of national security underpins Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown’s 2008 National 
Security Strategy of the United 
Kingdom.236 
 
A crucial implication of national security 
threats defined by a broad range of inter-
linked environmental economic, military 
and political factors is that future conflicts 
will be complex, diverse and not 
susceptible to purely military solutions. 
The Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit’s 2007 
review of strategic priorities for the UK 
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stated that “The security environment over 
the next 20-30 years will see threats from 
international terrorism, WMD and Failed 
and Failing States continue. Emerging 
trends including climate change, resource 
competition and demographics will 
potentially pose additional drivers for 
conflict. The way these threats interact 
and combine will further complicate the 
picture”. It went on to state that Britain’s 
armed forces will probably be used in 
conflict and non-conflict situations but 
cautions that “there will be less distinction 
between conflict and non-conflict 
situations, and operating environments 
will become more demanding. Military 
action alone will not be enough: integrated 
civilian and military solutions will be 
needed”.237  
 
In 2007 MOD’s Development, Concepts 
and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) released its 
third Global Strategic Trends analysis 
looking forward 30 years to 2036. The 
report cautions that “the future is 
characterised by a bewildering number of 
variables and all trends inter-relate with 
each other and inter-react in dynamic 
ways”.238 It too highlights the impact of 
climate change, expanding global 
population, globalisation, resource 
competition, transnational terrorism, failed 
and failing states, WMD proliferation, 
communicable disease, mass displacement 
of people and global inequality as key 
issues. It warns that “absolute poverty and 
comparative disadvantage will fuel 
perceptions of injustice among those 
whose expectations are not met, increasing 
tension and instability, both within and 
between societies and resulting in 
expressions of violence such as disorder, 
criminality, terrorism and insurgency.” It 
says that “conflict and crisis will become 
increasingly complex and unpredictable, 
both in their incidence and character”.239 
 
                                                     
237 “Policy Review: Summary of Background 
Papers”, Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, London, 
January 2007, p. 41. 
238 Global Strategic Trends, Development, 
Concepts and Doctrine Centre, p. v. 
239 Ibid., pp. 30, 67. 
The widespread acceptance that these 
varied and interlinking issues are an 
important determinant of national security 
means that military solutions to crises 
must now factor in the effect of the use of 
force on non-military dimensions of 
security. A purely military response to a 
crisis that exacerbates the detrimental 
impact of non-military factors on 
international and British security will be 
counter-productive. In such a complex 
future security environment the use of 
military force in regional crises will be 
messy, indeterminate and of limited value. 
It seems likely that lasting British security 
will rest instead on global arms control, 
closing the wealth-poverty divide, 
responding to environmental constraints 
through major development assistance and 
debt cancellation, massive cuts in carbon 
emissions and sustainable development 
policies, as the Prime Minister’s Strategy 
Unit’s 2008 report on Future Strategic 
Challenges for Britain and the 
independent Oxford Research Group both 
argue.240 
 
Nuclear deterrent threats do not fit this 
paradigm for two important reasons. First, 
it is extremely unlikely that the level of 
military security threats arising from the 
interaction of this myriad of security 
factors will threaten the very survival of 
the British state, even though British and 
wider Western political and economic 
interests will undoubtedly be threatened 
and future British governments may feel 
compelled to use military force in some 
instances.  
 
Second, it is far more likely that future 
conflicts symptomatic of the negative 
aspects of globalisation will take the form 
of ‘hybrid wars’ – a combination of 
international and civil war that blend 
“terror, insurgency and war... sparking 
myriad, hybrid forms of conflict”.241 Mary 
Kaldor draws a distinction between ‘old 
wars’ and ‘new wars’. New wars, she 
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argues, have to be understood in the 
context of globalisation and identity 
politics “in contrast to ideological or geo-
political goals of earlier wars”.242  This has 
several important repercussions for the 
relevance of nuclear deterrent threats.  
 
Hybrid wars will be characterised by the 
absence of front lines and clear a 
distinction between civilians and 
combatants based on a fragmentation and 
decentralisation of organised violence that 
avoids major battles and directs most 
violence against civilians. Zones of peace 
and conflict will co-exist and it will not be 
possible to contain such wars territorially. 
Conflict will probably be fuelled by 
clashing political identities operating at 
local, national and transnational levels, 
expanding urban populations, poverty and 
sectarian politics.243 They will also be 
characterised by guerrilla and counter-
insurgency warfare and “endemic urban-
based, irregular conflict” according to 
Global Strategic Trends.244 The aim will 
be to create and perpetuate a climate of 
fear, insecurity and hatred of the other 
through extreme levels of violence, ethnic 
cleansing and rendering areas 
uninhabitable.245 Iraq and Darfur are cited 
as contemporary examples of ‘hybrid’ or 
‘new’ wars.246 
 
The use of British military force will have 
to be selective and flexible and minimise 
collateral damage if it is to be effective in 
hybrid wars and not alienate local 
populations through indiscriminate 
slaughter. Stability, security, peace-
building and reconstruction tasks will 
become core military missions alongside 
or even in place of combat operations.247 
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Violence rooted in the clash of political 
identities might be contained with military 
force but the conflicts will only be 
resolved through political processes that 
reconcile competing identities. As Foreign 
Secretary David Miliband declared in 
2007, “while there are military victories 
there is never a military ‘solution’. 
There’s only military action that creates 
the space for economic and political 
life”.248 The war in Iraq against the Iraqi 
national army and then a range of 
religious/ethnic militias has demonstrated 
the extreme difficulty of the massive and 
sustained use of conventional warfare in 
winning a hybrid war in any meaningful 
way.  
 
Nuclear deterrent threats and the possible 
use of nuclear weapons can play no 
conceivable role addressing the complex 
challenges of future hybrid wars. Such 
wars are very unlikely to be fought by 
national armies backed by a population 
mobilised for war against which nuclear 
deterrent threats might conceivably work. 
Nuclear deterrent threats and the use of 
nuclear weapons will not create space for 
political processes, they will not bring 
stability to zones of war and peace, they 
will not in any way address the many non-
military causes of insecurity, and they will 
offer no means of control in future crises. 
It is evident that the use of nuclear 
weapons could not conceivably be of any 
benefit in achieving a stable Iraq. 
 
Their use by Britain in future complex 
conflicts would in all likelihood cause 
massive and indiscriminate casualties and 
the collapse of local social infrastructure. 
It would undoubtedly increase regional 
security problems from mass movements 
of refugees, economic disruption and 
radiation pollution of food and water 
sources. It would undermine disease 
prevention, poverty reduction, sustainable 
development and education initiatives and 
other UN Millennium Development Goals 
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to which the Labour Government has 
committed itself. It would inspire 
insurgent and terrorist reprisals in the 
region and at home and purge Britain of 
any international moral authority in its 
efforts to an international framework of 
sustainable development and sustainable 
security on which Britain’s long-term 
security ultimately depends.249 
 
It would also run completely counter to 
what Prime Minister Gordon Brown calls 
a “responsibility to protect behind borders 
where there are crimes against 
humanity”250 It is widely accepted that 
military intervention, particularly for 
humanitarian purposes, must be to halt or 
avert major human suffering; be a last 
resort; be proportional and constitute the 
minimum necessary force to secure 
defined human protection objectives; and 
the consequences of intervention should 
not be worse than the consequences of 
inaction.251 The use of nuclear weapons 
would cause large scale loss of life and 
human suffering, would be 
disproportionate and in all probability 
worse than the consequences of inaction. 
 
Nuclear weapons cannot therefore be 
considered a ‘general deterrent’ to counter 
future nuclear proliferation and they 
cannot be considered a ‘general deterrent’ 
to the uncertainties and future instabilities 
of increasingly integrating/fragmenting 
globalised world. They have no relevance 
to transnational and sub-national security 
threats, they provide no solution to the 
vulnerabilities Britain and the West will 
face from the types of conflict and 
insecurity resulting from these diverse, 
interdependent sources of insecurity. The 
threat to use nuclear weapons in the 
context of a tomorrow’s uncertain and 
complex security landscape must be 
dismissed.  
                                                     
249 Gordon Brown, speech to the United Nations, 
New York, July 31, 2007. 
250 Gordon Brown, speech at the Lord Mayor’s 
Banquet, Guildhall, London, November 12, 2007. 
251 Responsibility to Protect, International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 
Government of Canada, Ottawa, December 2001. 
Nick Ritchie 
 
 45 
 
Conclusion 
This report challenges the Government’s 
claim that nuclear deterrent threats are still 
relevant in four broad areas of deterrence, 
particularly the contention that nuclear 
weapons are needed to provide a ‘general 
deterrent’ for an uncertain future. It rests 
on three crucial facts: the effectiveness of 
nuclear deterrent threats depends on the 
credibility of the threat in the eyes of both 
the deterrer and the deteree; nuclear 
deterrent threats offer no guarantees of 
protection; and nuclear deterrent threats 
cannot be separated from the intention to 
use nuclear weapons. 
 
Only two nuclear-armed major powers, 
Russia and China, are likely to have the 
capability and conceivably the intention in 
the future to threaten Britain and Western 
Europe with nuclear weapons for the 
foreseeable future. Yet the trend in 
relations with both major powers has been 
extremely positive with Moscow since the 
end of the Cold War and the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991 and following a 
resumption of relations with Beijing in the 
early 1990s after the Tiananmen Square 
killings. Whilst both countries are 
modernising their nuclear forces, China 
has kept its arsenal deliberately small and 
Russia is keen to reduce its forces much 
further if a new agreement can be reached 
with America. Their nuclear forces are 
intended to deter attack from each other 
and the United States. NATO nuclear 
forces, including those of the United 
Kingdom, are of little relevance to 
Moscow’s or Beijing’s relationship with 
Europe. Both countries are becoming ever 
more integrated into the global economy 
and exhibit no desire to refashion the 
current international order to suit their 
own national interests, values and desires 
through use or threat of military force.  
 
There will undoubtedly be confrontations 
and periodic crises on a range of issues 
between the West and Russia and China 
but British nuclear deterrent threats have 
little prospective role to play in addressing 
and resolving such eventualities.  Conflict 
between the major powers, including 
between Russia and Britain or China and 
Britain, would be deeply destabilising, 
costly and counter-productive to all sides 
regardless of the threat to use or actual use 
of nuclear weapons. The near misses of 
the Cold War and the uncertainties of 
what is now often mistakenly recalled as a 
stable deterrent relationship between the 
USSR/Warsaw Pact and America/NATO 
also warn against a repeat of another 
second Cold War nuclear stand-off.  
 
WMD-armed ‘rogue’ states have become 
the primary military threat in American 
and wider Western security discourse. Yet 
serious questions hang over the credibility 
of British nuclear deterrent threats against 
WMD-armed ‘rogue’ states. The outcome 
of America’s 2001 Nuclear Posture 
Review was largely predicated on 
concerns about the credibility of threats to 
use Cold War-era high-yield nuclear 
warheads such as those deployed on 
British Trident missiles. America has 
decided to pursue missile defences, 
advanced precision guided strategic 
conventional weapons and, 
controversially, very low-yield nuclear 
weapons.  
 
In scenarios involving ‘rogues’ with 
limited WMD weapons the survival of the 
Britain or Western Europe will not be at 
What is Trident for? Nuclear deterrence and the role of Britain’s nuclear weapons 
 
 46
stake, British forces will be able to operate 
in a CBW environment, conventional 
forces will be capable of major retaliation 
and the use of nuclear weapons will likely 
be wholly disproportionate, of little 
military value and counter-productive to 
Western political objectives. In scenarios 
involving ‘rogues’ with more 
sophisticated WMD, such as nuclear 
missiles capable of reaching Britain and 
Western Europe, it would be dangerous to 
assume that British nuclear deterrent 
threats could keep a conflict at the level of 
conventional weaponry, particularly if the 
survival of the ‘rogue’ regime was 
threatened whose intentions, values and 
understandings were less than clear.  The 
asymmetry of the stakes in a regional 
conflict with a ‘rogue’ regime and the 
asymmetry in conventional firepower is 
liable to make a major conventional 
intervention extremely destabilising and 
carry a very real risk of escalation to the 
use of nuclear weapons. British nuclear 
weapons offer no guarantee that the 
degree of violence can be kept at a 
particular level. Limited military 
objectives may be achievable but 
containment, isolation or engagement will 
generally represent more productive 
strategic choices. This is supported by the 
extremely difficult and costly experience 
of intervening in Iraq in 2003, the 
estimated costs and impact of a conflict 
with North Korea in the early 1990s and 
the fact that one ‘rogue’ nuclear bomb 
detonated in British or allied city would 
constitute catastrophic political blunder by 
the British government. 
 
The credibility of threatening the 
population of a ‘rogue’ regime for the 
activities of the leadership is also 
questionable since it runs counter to the 
stated commitments to Western ‘Just War’ 
doctrine and the values on which British 
national security and foreign policy are 
supposedly based.252 Limiting the level of 
violence and indiscriminate killing are 
now essential criteria for any Western 
military intervention. The use of a handful 
of even relatively low-yield British 
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nuclear weapons runs counter to this 
objective. Using nuclear weapons for 
limited military objectives also lacks 
credibility and utility because of the 
extremely detrimental effect on the long-
standing nuclear ‘taboo’ and Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty that are so valuable to 
Britain. Nuclear use would only be 
realistically considered if tens, or even 
hundreds, of warheads were to be used 
causing widespread devastation.  
 
Similar reasons undermine the role British 
nuclear weapons can play in deterring 
state-sponsored acts of nuclear terrorism. 
Incontrovertible evidence of state 
sponsorship of nuclear terrorism will 
generally be difficult to ascertain, terrorist 
groups might actively seek a British or 
Western nuclear retaliation for their 
attacks, and killing many thousands or 
tens of thousands of civilians in the 
sponsoring state would be massively 
disproportionate. In fact the use of British 
nuclear weapons in the Middle East or 
North East Asia or other regional conflict 
zones must be recognised in advance as an 
unprecedented disaster with massive 
humanitarian, political and economic costs 
to the region and the West. 
 
Finally, the validity of the pervasive 
‘general deterrent for future uncertainty’ 
argument is undermined on three counts. 
First, Britain is unlikely to face a cascade 
of nuclear proliferation and future and 
there is no automatic link between nuclear 
weapons and potential capabilities in other 
countries and the essential necessity of a 
British nuclear capability. The argument 
that British nuclear weapons are needed to 
provide a general deterrent against any 
and all current and potential nuclear 
weapons capabilities needs to be replaced 
by analysis of specific potential nuclear 
threats. In reality only Iran, North Korea 
and Pakistan offer future nuclear threats in 
the context of regional crises. Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria and Libya could 
potentially join that list although the 
prospects for significant nuclear 
proliferation are debatable. Second, 
British nuclear deterrent threats are 
constrained by nuclear weapon-free zone 
  47 
treaties, negative security assurances and 
the 1996 International Court of Justice 
Advisory Opinion on the legality of the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons. 
 
Third, nuclear deterrent threats and the use 
of nuclear weapons by Britain cannot hope 
to offer any useful solution to complex 
future conflicts characterised by diverse 
and interdependent sources of insecurity 
and ‘hybrid’ wars that are not susceptible 
to purely military solutions and that are 
unlikely to threaten the survival of the 
British state. The Government’s assertion 
that nuclear weapons are needed to 
provide security in such a complex, 
uncertain future international security 
environment is highly questionable. The 
concept of national security has shifted 
with the end of the Cold War and the 
processes of globalisation to incorporate a 
host of environmental, political, military 
and economic factors.  
 
This is fully accepted by the Government. 
Several important outcomes of this trend 
undermine the relevance of nuclear 
deterrent threats in future conflicts and 
any semblance of stability and control 
they might conceivably provide. Future 
conflicts will be complex, diverse and not 
susceptible to purely military solutions 
and unlikely to threaten to security of the 
British state. Military responses to crises 
that exacerbate the detrimental impact of 
non-military factors on international and 
British security will be counter-
productive. The indiscriminate and 
devastating impact of nuclear weapons 
mean that nuclear deterrent threats have 
little relevance to new, hybrid wars fuelled 
by clashing political identities, poverty, 
environmental pressures and sectarian 
politics. Their use would run totally 
counter to the ‘responsibility to protect’ 
framework that is regularly used to justify 
military intervention with military force 
and exacerbate the many interconnected 
non-military factors fuelling a conflict. It 
is therefore extremely difficult to conceive 
of a useful role for British nuclear 
weapons and general nuclear deterrence 
threats in an uncertain, unstable globalised 
world.  
Serious questions can and must be 
legitimately asked of the role of British 
nuclear weapons over the medium and 
even long-term in providing security and 
contributing to international stability. The 
consequences of nuclear use at the major 
power level the regional level against 
‘rogue’ states, or in conflicts whose roots 
lie in a complex mixture of environmental, 
political, economic and military factors 
would be devastating and deeply counter-
productive to our security and long-term 
international stability. Yet the British 
political and defence establishment insists 
on keeping nuclear weapons ‘just in case’ 
because the future security environment 
appears so uncertain even though British 
nuclear threats offer no solution to the 
symptoms of that uncertainty and no 
‘insurance’ or guarantee of protection 
against future threats. 180 other countries 
on the planet, many in far more precarious 
security environments than Britain, do not 
feel compelled to have a nuclear crutch to 
lean on as they face the future and this 
analysis challenges the Government’s 
assertion that nuclear weapons are critical 
to dealing with future ‘unknown’ security 
threats. 
 
The Government cannot provide a solid 
assessment of exactly how British nuclear 
weapons can and will contribute to British 
and international security beyond the mere 
assertions that they do that were set out in 
the 2006 White Paper. It hides its inability 
to do so behind a policy of ‘deliberate 
ambiguity’ about the conditions under 
which Britain might contemplate using 
nuclear weapons based on the shaky 
argument that this might “simplify the 
calculations of a potential aggressor”.253 It 
is high time the Government accepted that 
nuclear weapons offer very little to British 
security and that it should rethink its 
decision to replace the current Trident 
nuclear weapon system. 
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